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JUDGING UNDER PRESSURE: A BEHAVIORAL
EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
LEGAL DECISIONMAKING AND TIME
BRIAN SHEPPARD
Abstract
The long-running debate about whether judges have adequate resources has begun to
boil. State and federal legislatures are slashing court budgets, with many courts receiving
up to twenty percent reductions. In recent years, judges have been resigning or retiring in
droves. The resulting judicial vacancies are often left unfilled. Those judges that remain will
be forced to spend considerably less time on each case.
In response to this impending crisis, scholars have just begun systematically and
empirically to consider how resource limitation affects judging. These studies are of vital
importance, not only because they are so topical, but also because they have found evidence
of a potential link between the amount of resources that appellate judges have and the
likelihood that they will be deferential to the lower courts or to their colleagues. For
example, a reduction in available resources correlates with lower reversal rates.
Because this academic movement is in its infancy, however, its techniques and findings
leave plenty of room for growth. While scholars have examined how resource limitation
affects case outcomes, they have yet to focus on how it impacts the reasoning and convictions
of the judges, themselves. Does it make judges more or less likely to follow the
straightforward dictates of the law? Does it affect judges’ beliefs that they have reached
righteous outcomes? These are pivotal concerns for those in control of court budgets and
personnel. If judges are able to do their jobs as well or better with less and they are willing
to accept less, then cutting budgets could very well be a wise savings measure. If judges
make more errors or become so dissatisfied that they no longer want to continue, then
stripping courts of resources could be very dangerous, if not destructive.
Here, I use behavioral experimentation to elucidate how the amount of time available to
decide a case could affect the likelihood that the judge in that case will straightforwardly
apply the law. Using a judicial simulation with law students at three law schools, I
uncovered evidence that reducing resources increases the likelihood of straightforward
application. Before budget cutters rejoice, however, I also discovered evidence that
enhancing legal constraint in this way comes with a cost—namely, a significant reduction
in judges’ convictions that they have reached righteous outcomes. The results here support
the idea that boosting legal constraint in this way might increase judge discontent, perhaps
exacerbating the problem of bench vacancies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is an era of austerity for the courts. Last year, forty state
court budgets were cut, some receiving twenty percent reductions.1
Twenty-nine state court systems have had their budgets slashed so
far this year.2 Over a dozen courts have shortened hours of
operation.3 Judicial pay is frozen or lagging.4 As a result, many
judges are seeking greener pastures. The New York Times recently
reported that, “[n]ow, for the first time in memory, judges are leaving
the bench in relatively large numbers—not to retire, but to return to
being practicing lawyers.”5 The state courts of New York have been
among the hardest hit: nearly one in ten judges are now leaving
annually, twice the number from a decade earlier.6 Compounding the
1. Richard Y. Schauffler & Matthew Kleiman, State Courts and the Budget Crisis:
Rethinking Court Services, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 289, 289 (Council of State
Government ed., 2010).
2. William Glaberson, Cuts Could Stall Sluggish Courts At Every Turn, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2011, at A1.
3. Id.
4. William Glaberson, Pay Frozen, More New York Judges Leave Bench, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2011, at A1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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strains caused by these absences are failures to fill empty seats.
Vacancies have reached “crisis” levels in the federal courts.7
Specifically, one-half of the federal bench will be unoccupied within
ten years if confirmation rates do not improve.8 Judges have more to
do, and they must do it with less.
We must now answer a grave question: what happens to judging
when the judges are stripped of resources?
The relationship between resources and judging has been
considered before,9 often by the judges themselves.10 Unsurprisingly,
judges paint an unflattering portrait of resource restriction, one of
ideological influence, limited access, and dwindling justice.11 Chief
Justice of the California Supreme Court, Tani Cantil-Sakauye,
recently claimed that proposed budget cuts would “strike[ ] a blow
against justice” and endanger judges’ ability to provide “fundamental
services.”12 Similarly, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, Margaret Marshall, recently claimed that inadequate
funding could eliminate judicial independence.13 Federal judges echo
this sentiment. In 2006, Chief Justice Roberts contended that, if
judicial appointment “becomes a stepping stone to a lucrative
position in private practice, the Framers’ goal of a truly independent
judiciary will be placed in serious jeopardy.”14 This past year, he set
his sights on judicial vacancies, describing them as one of the main
obstacles to “maintenance of the public trust.”15

7. See Press Release, Democratic Policy Committee, Fact Sheet: Judicial Vacancy
Crisis (Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/dpcdoc.cfm?doc_name=fs-112-1-4.
8. Id.
9. For an early example of academic analysis, see Charles Alan Wright, The
Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949,
949 (1964).
10. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 634, 642 (1974); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good
Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7-13 (1983); Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Are the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371
(1982); Judith S. Kaye, Op-Ed., Free Judges’ Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, at A35,
available at 2007 WLNR 10573173 (Chief Justice of New York Court of Appeals calling for
pay increase because lack thereof threatens “cherished liberties”).
11. See Kaye, supra note 10.
12. Shane Goldmacher, Chief Justice: “Crippling” California Court Cuts Would Be a Blow
Against Justice, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/
2011/06/chief-justice-crippling-california-court-cuts-would-be-a-blow-against-justice-.html.
13. Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall, President, Conference of Chief Justices,
Remarks at the American Bar Association House of Delegates (Feb. 16 2009), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Comm/ThisWeek/Marshall_remarks_021609.pdf.
14. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 6 (Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/
2006year-endreport.pdf.
15. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 4-5 (Dec. 31, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf.
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Responding to the growing sense of dread, legal academics have
begun to analyze the issue of resource restriction with renewed vigor
and improved empirical methodologies. Using published court data
such as judicial opinions, these empiricists have compared the
behavior of judges that have more resources, such as higher salaries
or more time to decide cases, to those that have less.16 A tentative
answer is beginning to emerge, and the most fascinating part is that
it is different from, and arguably more palatable than, the one that
the judges have given: judges respond to limited resources by
becoming more deferential to lower courts and less ideological.
Indeed, recent studies have provided evidence that judges are less
likely to reverse lower court decisions17 and to vote for outcomes that
are consistent with their political ideologies when they are busy18 and
that they are more likely to be independent19 and productive20 when
they give up more money to take the job. While these studies focus
upon myriad dimensions of judging—and I detail their methodologies
and findings below—these aspects of their research in particular
have contributed to a growing divide between academics and judges
on this issue of appropriate resources. Professor Eric Posner, a
coauthor of one such study, recently stated “[t]he absence of [salary]
raises is a problem only if judges weren’t overpaid to begin with.”21
Should society fight against court budget cuts? Should it embrace
them? As the preceding discussion suggests, the question of whether
judges are adequately resourced turns in large part on how the
availability of resources affects the quality of judging.
Determining the quality of a judge’s decision in a case is an
activity fraught with subjectivity. Unsurprisingly, existing empirical
studies leave us wondering whether deferential and counterideological voting constituted good judging in those cases.
Fortunately, debates about what makes good judging tend to focus on
two distinct phenomena—what I call here “straightforward” and
16. See, e.g., Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1116-33
(2011) (comparing circuit courts with suddenly high docket loads to those with normal
docket loads).
17. Id. at 1127-33.
18. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 820-24 (2009) (comparing frequency of counter-ideological
voting by judges in Circuit Courts to those in Supreme Court).
19. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A
Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 96 (2009)
(measured by proportion of dissents against judges appointed by the same party and
controlled for court composition, the more often they dissented against their own party’s
judges, the more independent).
20. Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63, 66
(2008) (measured by time it took judges to file published opinions after hearing
oral argument).
21. Glaberson, supra note 4.
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“indirect” adjudication—the identification of which can be done
without sacrificing objectivity. In the remainder of the Introduction,
I will briefly explain what these terms mean, how they figure in the
debate about what makes for good judging, and how they can be
studied empirically.
For a judge to have the option of engaging in either
straightforward or indirect adjudication, the case before her must
involve the interpretation of an authoritative legal norm, the face of
which makes a dispositive directive readily apparent. When a judge
has chosen to follow that directive, he or she has engaged in
straightforward adjudication. When a judge has chosen not to, he or
she has engaged in indirect adjudication.
It is widely believed that law is valuable largely because it has the
capacity to force judges to reach the outcomes that are called for
under straightforward adjudication even when the judges would
prefer not to. This is a central example of a more general concept
known as legal “constraint.” Law is constraining when judges
experience that the law forces them to choose in ways that are
at odds with the way that they would have chosen in the absence
of law.22
Many believe that straightforward adjudication, when possible, is
the best or even the correct way to resolve a legal dispute.23 The
higher the likelihood that judges will be constrained under law to
engage in straightforward adjudication, the better, or so they believe.
One corollary of this account of law is that legal rules have the
capacity to dictate single results in the cases to which they apply by
providing sufficient and exclusive directives that answer disputes.
On that account, a judge that does not engage in straightforward
adjudication under such circumstances is acting in defiance of the
22. Frederick Schauer adopts a similar approach to understanding constraint
empirically. Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official
Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 789 (2010) (“Having arrived at what they believe to be the best
law-independent decision, when, if at all, are officials willing to set that decision aside in
the service of a legal constraint they believe mistaken?”). See also Mark Tushnet, Popular
Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 991 (2006) (“As law, it
sometimes induces decision-makers to make decisions that are inconsistent with their
‘pure’ preferences, that is, those they would hold in the absence of law.”).
23. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith, and Reginald S. Sheehan,
Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 963,
970-71 (1989) (“If the case involves, as the criteria suggests, the straightforward
application of clear and well-settled precedent which is not in need of any published
explanation by the courts of appeals, then the correct decision and the correct basis of
decision should be obvious to any person who is well trained in the law. Since federal
district court judges are highly trained professionals, they should be expected to reach the
correct decision in such cases and thus to have their decisions affirmed.”); Wilson v.
Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("The language of the
statute at issue is plain and straightforward and the words, therefore, must be accorded
their plain meaning.").
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law. She is refusing to allow the law to constrain her. Perhaps the
most well known proponent of this account is Chief Justice Roberts,
who famously analogized the role of the judge to the role of the
umpire, “to call balls and strikes.”24 Others feel differently, of course,
most notably those that believe the judicial role often calls for resort
to equity, to law’s background morality, or to morality generally even
when the conditions permitting straightforward adjudication are
met.25 In other words, they argue that the correct legal outcome does
not necessarily follow straightforwardly from a legal directive. For
them, the complexity and robustness of law is such that it sometimes
provides judges with circuitous, yet entirely permissible or even
authoritative pathways that are at odds with straightforward
adjudication.26 On this view, the law has the power to constrain, but
the constraining directive does not always come from the face of the
authoritative legal norm.
Thankfully, neither identifying constraint nor distinguishing
between instances of straightforward and indirect adjudication
requires the researcher to take a side in the normative aspects of the
debate, and here I endorse neither straightforward nor indirect
adjudication (nor, for that matter, constraint). I instead seek to shed
light on a descriptive component of adjudication—namely, the
likelihood that judges are willing to engage in indirect adjudication
and whether certain conditions augment this tendency. Put
differently, rather than aiming to answer the normative
24. United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) (statement Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be
Chief Justice of the United States) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] at 56.
25. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Law and Morality: Four Reflections on Law and
Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523, 15 (2007) (“Aquinas talks of overruling the letter of
a statute with its spirit, Fuller, of using the purpose of a statute and not its ordinary
English semantics, Dworkin, of prioritizing a principle over a rule, and Cardozo, of saving
the common law from rigidity in the face of changes in what Holmes called ‘the felt
necessities of the times.’ These all come to much the same thing: a judge should use
morality to declare the obvious law not to be what obligates either him or the citizens he
judges, in cases where the obvious law leads to such absurd results.”); Henry E. Smith,
Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1047, 1050-1051 (2011)
(espousing virtues of equity in tax avoidance context and stating, “To serve as a safety
valve against opportunism, equity is a holistic mode of decision making that is not fully
captured by rules versus standards.”) Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685, 1773-74 (1976) (discussing positive
altruistic role that moral standards play in law); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 15, 38, 54-55 (1987) (same).
26. See Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the
Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1097, 1139 (2002) (Discussing the
various indirect adjudicatory options in relation to legal complexity and stating “It is
important to note that the following analysis can be made of virtually any appellate case.
Rogers is a convenient example because of its relative simplicity and brevity. This case is
also suitable for the current purposes in that it cuts across the paradigmatic ideological
line that divides the Court. The observations made from this case are typically more
pronounced in longer and more complex cases.”) (citation omitted).
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straightforward/indirect debate, I aim to provide evidence of the
conditions that bring about the two behaviors at its heart, including
when such behaviors exhibit law’s constraining power.
There are multiple ways empirically to isolate law’s (or the
content of law’s) impact on judicial decisionmaking. One way is to
analyze how the presence of law leads to outcomes that are at odds
with those that judges would prefer in the absence of law under the
same facts. Another way is to compare how different kinds of legal
content affect judicial decisionmaking under the same facts. Still a
third way is to combine these approaches.
Unfortunately, the popular empirical methodology for law’s
impact on judicial decisionmaking does not permit any of these
approaches. Thereunder, empiricists limit their analysis to the data
that can be extracted from accessible court documents. Rarely (if
ever), does the same judge or court encounter the same facts in
multiple cases and under different legal authority or no legal
authority at all. Instead, empiricists have mostly taken a different
approach: they reduce judges to black boxes that take in ideological
inputs from one end and spit out liberal or conservative case
outcomes from the other.27 Under this approach, when data show that
busy judges decide cases that are at odds with their ideologies more
often than judges that have lighter workloads, the empiricists
suppose that the busy judges have followed the law more often.28
Certainly, the black-box method has the virtue of objectivity; it
eliminates the need to code the potentially subjective variable of
whether the judge voted for the correct legal outcome. The resulting
problem is obvious, however: the busy judges might have gotten their
cases wrong or otherwise engaged in subpar adjudication.
Judges can vote against their ideology for any number of reasons,
many of which are not related to the law they interpret.29 They might
have been so rushed that they did not pay attention to the law at all.
They might have been engaging in strategic compromises with fellow
panel judges so that they would get a favorable result in a future case
that is more ideologically important to them. They simply might not
be as ideologically engaged with the case they are considering as
the empiricists think they are. This problem of behavioral

27. See discussion infra Part II.
28. See Landes & Posner, supra note 18.
29. The landmark law review article indicating that counter-ideological voting in
appellate panels might not reflect a lack of ideologically-motivated strategy is Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717,
1764-69 (1997); see also Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Toward
Conformity in a Three-Person Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S.
Court of Appeals, 54 SOC. SCI. Q. 41 (1973).
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equivalence—when different behaviors produce the same data in an
analysis30—is a byproduct of the black-box approach.
This Article uses behavioral experimentation to peer into the
black box. By eliminating the need to rely on publicly available court
documents and instead relying on data gathered from simulations,
we gain unprecedented control over the decisionmaking environment.
Reliance on court documents forces empiricists to compare judges
even though they are deciding under different precedent, for different
cases, and with different individual workloads. Moreover, they must
use rough, imperfect proxies to guess how those judges would prefer
to decide the cases that are before them, such as the party of the
president who appointed them. Behavioral experimentation, on the
other hand, can be used to identify the outcome that the judges
prefer in the very case that they are considering, and it allows us to
compare only those judges that share the same preferences, all while
controlling for the precise amount of resources that each judge has.
In addition, using that approach in this context can teach us more
about what the judges are thinking and, most importantly, how the
amount of resources they have affects their thinking. We can ask
judges to provide virtually unlimited information about their
decisionmaking at the very moment that they are engaged in it.
The experimental subjects in the judicial simulations at the heart
of this Article were law students at highly ranked schools that had
completed approximately one year of study or more. Needless to say,
it would have been optimal to use actual judges, but that approach
was simply unworkable in a study such as this, which requires over
one hundred subjects that are willing to participate in multiple
sessions to achieve statistically significant results. Consequently,
this study follows the commonplace practice of using graduate-level
students to test hypotheses that concern real-life counterparts.31
30. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Response, Psychology, Strategy,
and Behavioral Equivalence, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 75, 76-77 (2009) (discussing
behavioral equivalence issue in study of panel effects).
31. It would be hasty to dismiss the results of this study on that ground, alone: “By
now there is also a significant body of evidence showing how even simulation or survey
studies using, say, college and university students—as is often the case in psychology
experiments—typically generate results resembling those of experiments using more
realistic participants and designs. Similarly, the results of decision-making studies using
monetary incentives for performance largely correspond with those of psychological
experiments, which often do not rely on financial incentives.” Avishalom Tor, The
Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237, 285-86 (2008). Indeed,
in a nearly identical experiment, I collected data about the amount of law school education
and also included in the subject pool those that had been law school graduates for up to two
and a half years. There were no statistically significant differences with respect to any of
the time-unrelated hypotheses described below between those that had graduated from law
school and those that had only completed a half-year. See Brian Sheppard & Andrew
Moshirnia, For the Sake of Argument, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2012). Of
course, that does not mean that the external validity of these results cannot be scrutinized.
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The results of the experiment both match and build upon those of
earlier studies. First, like earlier studies,32 the results provide
empirical support for the claim that limiting resources increases
judicial deference and decreases the impact of ideology on case
outcomes. Critically, however, the results here also support a finding
that this result is caused by increased deference to the content of the
law. In other words, time limitation made it more likely that subjects
would straightforwardly follow the legal directives that applied to
their cases.
While this finding is good news to those who seek to cut court
budgets, there is bad news as well. Subjects under time limitation,
particularly those who followed the law, experienced a considerable
drop in the strength of their belief that they were doing the right
thing in deciding their cases as they did.33 Meanwhile, those
who followed the law without time limitation experienced the
opposite effect—they felt more strongly about the righteousness of
their decisions.34
Thus, stripping judges of resources might strengthen the
constraining power of the law but weaken the judges’ beliefs that
they did the right thing when they made their decisions. Indeed,
this interaction between restriction and conviction might explain
why judges are leaving the bench despite being, as Posner
says, overpaid.35
In the following Part, I summarize the existing scholarship on the
relationship between legal constraint and judicial resources. I further
propose specific changes to the models of legal constraint used in
these and other empirical studies, changes drawn from analysis and
observation of typical judging behaviors. The remainder of the Article
is devoted to the design and results of my empirical research. In Part
III, I detail a revised model and explain how it has been incorporated
into the experiment that is at the heart of this study. In Parts IV and
V, I describe and analyze the results of the experiment. Finally, in
Part VI, I consider the policy implications of those results and outline
opportunities for further study.

32. See Huang, supra note 16; Landes & Posner, supra note 18; Choi, et al., supra
note 19; Baker, supra note 20.
33. See discussion infra Part IV.
34. See discussion infra Part IV & V.C.
35. Glaberson, supra note 4.
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II. CRITIQUING THE PREVAILING EMPIRICAL MODEL
OF LEGAL CONSTRAINT
The study of the relationship between judging and resources is the
latest chapter of the empirical revolution in legal academia.36 The
strengths and weaknesses of this recent work mirror the majority of
general empirical legal studies of courts. In this Part, I first
summarize the latest research on the interaction and then I describe
the shortcomings that prevail in the scholarship, generally.
A. Recent Scholarship on Judging and Resources
In the last few years, there have been a handful of impressive
studies that analyze how resources affect judicial performance. With
respect to resources, the focus has been on two dimensions of judicial
life—workload and salary. Each dimension corresponds to specific
problems currently facing the judiciary. As discussed, many courts
are shorthanded, so judges are facing higher docket loads.37 In
addition, judicial salaries have been falling for decades (at least when
adjusted for increased costs of living).38 It is obvious that shortages in
either judge free time or salary could impact judging, and the
following studies provide support.
1. Significant Discoveries
The most impressive study that has focused on the relationship
between workload and judging is Bert Huang’s recent analysis of the
surge in the immigration cases that resulted from post-9/11
deportation “streamlining.”39 Two circuits, the Ninth and Second,
bore the brunt of the surge; most others remained largely
untouched.40 When comparing the circuits, Professor Huang
discovered that the Ninth and Second Circuits overruled significantly
fewer cases than they had before, whereas the reversal rate in the
other circuits stayed the same.41 He further showed that a similar
reduction occurred in the Second Circuit when it experienced a
momentary reduction in available judges a few years earlier.42

36. See Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 853, 854 n.10 (2011) (describing “empirical revolution”).
37. Id.
38. Amanda Becker, Federal Judges Ask Supreme Court to Hear Case on Their Pay,
WASH. POST, (June 28, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
06/25/AR2010062504394.html.
39. Huang, supra note 16, at 1113-14.
40. Id. at 1121-26.
41. Id. at 1135 figs.9 & 10, 1150-52.
42. Id. at 1136.

2012]

JUDGING UNDER PRESSURE

941

In a separate study, William Landes and Richard Posner make
similar findings through different methods.43 After a thorough
comparison of the voting patterns between the U.S. Supreme Court
and the U.S. Courts of Appeals, they discovered that court of appeals
judges were more likely than Supreme Court justices to vote against
the interests of the parties that appointed them by a margin of about
15% for Republican appointees and 20% for Democratic appointees.44
In addition, they found that court of appeals judges were more likely
to engage in conformist voting—voting as the predominant political
bloc of their circuit votes.45 Landes and Posner’s study was not
specifically designed to test the impact of resource restriction; rather,
its primary goal was to determine whether judges exhibited economic
rationality under the particular circumstances of their respective
institutions.46 The reason that this study is of interest here, however,
is that a key assumption of their empirical model is that resource
restriction interacts with law’s constraining power.
In particular, Landes and Posner contend that the conformist and
counter-ideological voting in the courts of appeals is a result of
comparatively higher costs of writing a dissent.47 The costs are
higher, they suppose, because the workloads of the court of appeals
judges are heavier.48 When free time is bountiful, such persuasive
and probably fruitless writing is not particularly costly. An increase
in the costs of resisting the majority forces in their circuits, they
speculate, leads the judges to follow and even value precedent more
than their colleagues on the Supreme Court:
Especially given leisure preference, the heavier workload in the
courts of appeals makes the cost of a dissent greater for courts of
appeals judges than for Supreme Court Justices. The heavier
workload also increases the benefits of decision according to
precedent, which greatly reduces the time and effort involved in a
decision . . . So we can expect decision in accordance with precedent
to be more valued in the courts of appeals. That reduces the value of
a dissent, because the majority vote will establish the precedent
and the dissent will usually have no influence on the law.49

43. Landes & Posner, supra note 18.
44. Id. at 823. They also adopted a tripartite system of classification: “And if we
classify Justices as conservatives, moderates, and liberals, we found that ratio of the
fraction of conservative votes of conservative to liberal Justices was about 2.5 times higher
than ratio of judges appointed by Republican and Democratic Presidents in the court of
appeals.” Id.
45. See id. at 821.
46. See id. at 779.
47. Id. at 820-21.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 820-21.
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In other words, they find that restricting resources positively
correlates with legal constraint.
Rounding out the empirical analysis of judicial resources is a pair
of studies examining the relationship between judicial pay and
performance.50 In a similar, previous study, Scott Baker found that
higher judicial pay neither reduced ideological decisionmaking nor
increased the effort of judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.51 With
respect to ideology, Baker analyzed whether higher pay made judges
more likely to vote against their personal ideologies in controversial
cases52 and whether it made them more likely to cite judges
appointed by opposing parties as persuasive authority.53 With respect
to effort, he analyzed whether higher pay increased dissent rates in
controversial cases54 and whether it decreased the time it took judges
to file published opinions after hearing oral argument.55 Not only did
he find no evidence of these relations, he found that those who had
greater cuts in pay when they entered the judiciary issued published
opinions the quickest.56
In the second study, Stephen Choi and others found that, among
the justices of state high courts, higher salary did not correlate with
increases in any of the positive metrics they devised, including
productivity (measured by pages of published opinions), higher
quality opinions (measured by out-of-state citations), or judicial
independence (measured by proportion of dissents against judges
appointed by the same party controlled for court composition).57 They
even found evidence that higher salaries might make judges less
independent; as those judges that experienced higher opportunity
costs in choosing to be judges exhibited higher independence.58
Looking at these studies collectively, a rather rosy picture of
judicial resource restriction emerges. When it comes to pay, there
seems to be no relationship between high pay and better
performance, even considering metrics that reflect upon the judges’
willingness to be constrained by law. When considering workload, it
appears that there is a positive correlation between workload and
deference, and if Landes and Posner are right, this deference is a
result of increased willingness to be constrained by law.

50. See generally Choi et al., supra note 19; Baker, supra note 20.
51. See Baker, supra note 20, at 66.
52. Id. at 85-94.
53. Id. at 95-98.
54. Id. at 98-101.
55. Id. at 101-05.
56. Id. But see Christopher Zorn et al., Working Class Judges, 88 B.U. L. REV. 829,
834, 834 tbl.1 (2008) (noting opposite correlation in top five legal markets).
57. Choi et al., supra note 19, at 64-73.
58. Id. at 96.
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2. Limitations
While these studies present a potential silver lining to the dark
cloud of forced austerity, it is important to remind ourselves that the
relationship between resources and constraint remains an open
question.59 One dimension of constraint that remains unstudied is of
crucial social importance: are we seeing increased legal constraint or
are we seeing something else? Professor Huang was keenly aware of
this problem:
Without a deep understanding of the case composition in each
circuit, it would be hard to draw credible inferences from
[differences in reversal rates between circuits]. (It could be that
the circuit with the higher reversal rate is actually the one
reviewing with greater deference — only, it has a higher
concentration of reversal-prone cases.) The same goes for a single
circuit whose reversal numbers are seen to change over time. 60

It is difficult to account for the specific role that law plays in the
judges’ decisions, such as in their decisions not to reverse. Does the
judge feel that the law compels affirmance, or is the judge simply
trying to push cases off his or her desk? Has the law constrained the
judge or not? Each of the studies described here makes progress in
answering these questions, but their authors either were focused on
other issues or were justifiably content to be among the first to
identify a relationship between resources and constraint rather than
to explore that relationship at length.
Professor Huang’s study, for example, does not analyze the
content of the cases before each circuit outside of adopting their
general subject matter as labeled by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts.61 His omission is reasonable: the goal of the study was to
isolate the effect of workload on reversal rates—a remarkable feat in
itself—but it was never a study of legal constraint. In a nutshell,
Professor Huang counted reversals, comparing the rate of reversal
during busy times and not-so-busy times, both within circuits and
between circuits. And Professor Huang is right that comparisons
involving a high number of cases will lower the risk that the effect he
has identified is merely the byproduct of a higher proportion of
reversal-prone cases in the unimpacted circuits. Nevertheless, even if
we assume that each court had the exact same proportion of cases
that, given ordinary workloads, would end up being reversed (or
“reversal-prone” cases), the study provides no way to determine
whether the drop in reversals reflects an increase or decrease in the
59. See, e.g., id. at 102 (“More work needs to be done before the relationship between
salary and judicial quality is understood.”).
60. Huang, supra note 16, at 1145.
61. Id. at 1147.
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proportion of cases determined by straightforward adjudication or,
relatedly, whether the law constrained judges. In particular, the
study cannot tell us whether judges under normal workloads were
more or less likely than busier judges to follow the straightforward
dictates of the law—or even whether such straightforward
dictates were present and applicable—when they chose to reverse
lower court decisions.
This is a question that we ought to endeavor to answer. On the
one hand, it is entirely plausible that judges during unimpacted
periods are less likely to engage in straightforward adjudication than
they would be during impacted periods. It could be that they have the
free time to work around the law, granting them the resources to
write convincing justifications for the outcomes that they
ideologically prefer despite the possibility that such outcomes are at
odds with the facial content of the applicable legal rule. When they
are busy, it could be that they must limit their justifications to those
provided by a plain reading of the law's facial content, and, as a
result, they are unable to reverse lower court decisions that did not
produce ideologically preferred outcomes. As a result, they might be
less likely to commit errors of law and might reach ideologically
preferred outcomes at a lower rate. On the other hand, it is entirely
plausible that busy judges are more interested in completing cases
than they are in interpreting those cases in accordance with the law
or in bringing about ideologically preferred outcomes. As a result of
their haste, they might be more likely to commit errors of law and
miss the cases that they should have reversed or inadvertently reach
ideologically preferred outcomes at a higher rate.
The Landes and Posner study also leaves this mystery unsolved.62
While they speculated that conformist and counter-ideological voting
could be explained by a relationship between increased legal
constraint and higher workloads, they did not rule out other
explanations.63 Indeed, the decision of judges in the ideological
minority to resist dissent might be a reflection of power dynamics or
mere laziness rather than a respect for the prevailing law in a circuit.
As claimed by some adherents of the “strategic” or “institutionalist”
model,64 counter-ideological voting might arise from, say, a bargain
with the other appellate panel judge: if I agree to go along with the
writing judge in the next several cases, she will agree to go along
with me in the one case that is very important to me down the road.
Or the judges might be aware that the majority bloc of judges would
never be persuaded by a dissent, so the effort to signal a case for en
62. See Landes & Posner, supra note 18.
63. Id. at 820-21.
64. See James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO.
L.J. 515, 533-36 (2011).
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banc review would be fruitless. Or the judges might be acting out of
fear of retaliation from other branches of government. Again, any
number of explanations might suffice.
Lastly, while the Choi and Baker studies are welcome antiseptics
to the hyperbolic rhetoric that sometimes accompanies discussions of
judicial salaries, they too have not yet satisfactorily tested for legal
constraint under different resource conditions.65 Their tests for
judicial independence are admirable, but they mirror the tests for
ideological voting used in the Landes study and, therefore, suffer
from the same shortcomings—namely, that voting in what appears to
be a counter-ideological manner is not necessarily evidence of legal
constraint.66 Their model has additional limitations, however.
Judicial salary is a poorer measure of resources than workload. While
salary can change the caliber of the people hired for the job, it would
not likely affect on-the-job performance beyond the margins. There
are greater disparities in the amount of cases that judges are asked
to complete per day than there are in judicial salary (or quality).67
And no matter how much a judge is paid, there will always be only
twenty-four hours in a day.
In summary, the handful of existing empirical studies on this
subject provides evidence of a relationship between how judges vote
and how many resources they have. They are landmark studies for
probing this connection. They do not show, however, that a lack of
resources makes judges more likely to follow the law. The two
primary shortcomings are that they do not identify the
straightforward legal result in the cases that they analyze and they
do not have a test that allows us to verify that the judges have been
constrained by law in the cases before them. These scholars are not
alone. In the following section, I detail how the majority of empirical
studies of judging share these weaknesses in the hope that we can
elucidate the way in which methodologies might be changed to
alleviate them.

65. See Baker, supra note 20; Choi et al., supra note 19.
66. See supra notes 60-63, 65 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. immigration judges hear about 1,200 cases annually and were paid a starting
salary of approximately $120,000 in 2006. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-06-381, PERSONNEL PRACTICES: CONVERSIONS OF EMPLOYEES FROM NONCAREER
TO CAREER POSITIONS MAY 2001 - APRIL 2005 33-34, 75 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06381.pdf; Julia Preston, Lawyers Back Creating New
Immigration Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at A14. Compare this to U.S. Supreme
Court justices, who hear only about 75 cases annually and were paid a starting salary of
approximately $210,000 in 2009. BARBARA L. SCHWEMLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33245, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL OFFICIALS: PROCESS FOR ADJUSTING PAY
AND CURRENT SALARIES 8 (2011).
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B. The Challenges of Modeling Law’s Effect on Judging
How do we know when a judge has been constrained by law? This
is a question that has plagued empiricists for decades. There are two
main difficulties—one from law and the other from behavior. On the
law side, it is hard to know objectively what the correct legal outcome
of a case is. On the behavioral side, it is tough to distinguish between
judicial decisions that are the result of legal constraint and those
that are the result of something nonlegal like ideology, strategy, or
laziness; the decisions, themselves, might look identical. If we cannot
draw lines between these behaviors, it might prove too challenging to
isolate law’s effect. The lion’s share of empirical scholarship reflects a
tendency to avoid these problems rather than to face them head on. I
argue that if we are willing to broaden our methodological
approaches, such as by including behavioral experimentation, we can
eliminate or alleviate the troubles they cause.
1. Identifying the Law
In modeling legal constraint, scholars initially focused on judges’
ideological preferences,68 and for good reason. Political scientists were
the first to be interested in the project of empirically analyzing
whether law influences judges, and they widely believed at the outset
that the judiciary, like other branches of government, is a political
organ that has an interest in instituting its own policy.69 In short,
they hypothesized that the judge’s ideological preference would be
the best predictor of the outcome of the case before the judge when
political stakes were high. Most famously, political scientists used
the party of the individual responsible for a judge’s appointment as a
simple proxy for the judge’s attitude in politically divisive cases.70
The results were astounding.71 This factor, alone, has been shown to
68. See DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 78
(1976) (“[Attitude is] a set of interrelated beliefs that a person has toward some object and
the situation within which it is encountered.”). These scholars are called “attitudinalists.”
Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory and
Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008).
69. See Lee Epstein et al., Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and
Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 305, 320-21
(2003); RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 47 (2008).
70. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1479 (2003) (“Most empirical studies of ideology in decisionmaking use
the political party of the judge's appointing president as a proxy for the judge's own
political ideology.”).
71. See ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 51-83 (1983); DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
LAW 78 tbl.3.1, 80 tbl.3.2 (2003); Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 33
(2001); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1636, 1651 (1998); Carol T. Kulik et al., Here Comes the
Judge: The Influence of Judge Personal Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment Case
Outcomes, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 74-76, 81-82 (2003); Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial
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have considerable predictive force at the Supreme Court level.72 Early
proponents of this approach supposed that when judges voted in a
manner that was consistent with their ideologies, they were not
being constrained by law.73 When judges voted counter-ideologically,
however, Attitudinalists were willing to concede that the outcome
might be legally dictated.74 That is to say that when the input of
ideology matched the judge vote, then the result was a finding of no
legal constraint, and vice versa.
This “counter-ideological voting” model is still prevalent. Indeed,
the Landes, Choi, and Baker studies all employ a version of it.75
Rather than replacing it, the primary mode of methodological
innovation was to improve the modeling of judges’ ideological
preferences. Scholars devised better ways to identify the ideology of
judges or included new variables that reflected behavioral or
personal characteristics.76 For example, they added race, gender, age,
or prior experience to the list of independent variables.77 Other times,
they used more accurate or scientific proxies for ideology.78 Again,
results were impressive. It has been shown that female judges on
federal appellate panels were significantly more likely to find for the
plaintiff in Title VII sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases
independent of political ideology,79 were significantly more likely to
Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 333, 334-35
(1962); Donald R. Songer & Martha Humphries Ginn, Assessing the Impact of Presidential
and Home State Influences on Judicial Decisionmaking in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 55 POL. RES. Q. 299 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004); Sarah
Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited: The Data Since 1994,
92 GEO. L.J. 689, 702-04 (2004).
72. See PINELLO, supra note 71; Cross, supra note 70, at 1479-81.
73. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Authors Respond, 4 LAW AND
COURTS, 10, 10-12 (1994).
74. Francisco J. Benzoni & Christopher S. Dodrill, Does Judicial Philosophy Matter?:
A Case Study, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 287-89 (2011).
75. Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 823; Choi et al., supra note 19, at 78-92;
Baker, supra note 20, at 85-94.
76. One approach was to devise ideology scores that were based on exogenous factors.
See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of
the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1178
(2010) (discussing endogeneity problem with using data culled from judges’ votes to predict
those same votes).
77. See, e.g., Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on the
Michigan Supreme Court, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1205 (2000) (race); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1768–87 (2005) (gender); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior
on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 499, 499 tbl.6,
500-01, 501 tbl.7 (1975) (age); Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., The Politics of Dissents and
Concurrences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 AM. POL. Q. 488, 494 (1999) (experience).
78. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Assessing Preference Change on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J. OF L., ECON. & ORG., 303, 303-325 (2007).
79. Peresie, supra note 77; Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on
Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-96 (dissertation, Dept. of
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rule in favor of gay rights claims,80 and decided divorce cases and
custody disputes differently in many respects.81 Other studies of
federal courts found that older judges were more conservative in a
number of areas, such as labor cases and draft resistance cases.82
Despite these worthwhile findings, it is evident that the counterideological voting approach does not succeed in verifying whether
judges were constrained by law. As to identifying the specific impact
of law on judging—rather than inferring its absence from the
predicting power of nonlegal inputs—things have progressed slowly.
Legal scholars of all stripes understand the complexity of finding and
applying law, so developing a falsifiable model of legal effect, known
as a “legal model,” is quite difficult.83
Nevertheless, more and more scholars are willing to enter the
thicket of legal interpretation when they study judicial voting. In
their review of empirical analysis of opinions between 1956 and mid2006, Mark A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright found that studies
analyzing the content of opinions beyond the mere the analysis of
outcomes and general area of law are on the rise.84 Between 1956 and
1989, a thirty-three-year period, only twenty-five such studies had
been published.85 In the next ten-year period, however, there were
fifty-seven.86 And in the first six and a half years of this millennium,
there were fifty-two.87
One promising approach that has arisen among the legal modelers
has been to identify a rather simple legal rule or tenet of the
established legal canons of construction and analyze whether its
implementation brings about a predictable change in judges’ votes.
While these studies do not typically seek to isolate legal effect from
all institutional or other effects,88 they are nevertheless insightful.
Political Science, University of Chicago 1999) discussed in Theresa M. Beiner, Diversity on
the Bench and the Quest for Justice for All, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 485 (2007).
80. PINELLO, supra note 71, at 83.
81. See Martin & Pyle, supra note 77; Vicki C. Jackson, What Judges Can Learn from
Gender Bias Task Force Studies, 81 JUDICATURE 15, 21 n.38 (1997).
82. See Goldman, supra note 77; Herbert M. Kritzer, Political Correlates of the
Behavior of Federal District Judges: A “Best Case” Analysis, 40 J. POL. 25, 28, 50 (1978).
83. See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and
the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1691 (2010) (“Until recently, it
would have been difficult to identify an objective and convenient way to rate the complexity
of large quantities of text.”).
84. See generally Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of
Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 72, 121 (2008).
85. Id. at 72.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An
Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 857 (2006) (“[I]t eludes
us how to test whether agreement in a unanimous cases is based on legal or policy
preferences, absent candid participant statements or more sophisticated information about
the judges’ preferences.”).
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Some legal modelers have chosen to test vertical stare decisis in the
federal appellate courts by analyzing whether trends in lower court
outcomes predictably changed in accordance with new rules issued by
the Supreme Court—expected statistically significant changes were
observed.89 Others have analyzed standards of review, determining
the relative likelihood of affirmance under increasingly deferential
standards (de novo, clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion,
substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious).90 As expected under
the legal point of view, the level of affirmance corresponded to the
level of deference.91 On the other hand, studies have shown that the
predictions of legalism can come up short. One example tested
adherence to horizontal stare decisis at the Supreme Court by
determining whether dissenters in a case had changed their positions
when the progeny of that case later came before them.92 Justices
overwhelmingly continued to dissent in progeny cases.93
While this approach has the advantage that it does not require the
empiricist to engage in complex and potentially subjective
interpretation of law, its primary disadvantage is that simple,
straightforward examples of legal application are rare. And even
when they are found, they rarely stay straightforward for long. Law
is a moving target; it constantly evolves through application,
especially in a system of precedent like we have in the United
States.94 As a result, opportunities for complex study—such as the
study of limited resources on constraint—are far too rare.
Returning to the question of how to analyze resource restriction on
judges, we must develop a methodology that allows for the analysis of
cases with known legally straightforward outcomes in a variety of
subject areas and conditions. Because law’s intrinsic constraining
power is a fundamental concern for those seeking to determine the
appropriate amount of resources, the question of whether judges are
likely to engage in straightforward adjudication under legal rules
cannot be ignored. So how do we overcome the fact that suitable
conditions for analyzing the manner of adjudication in actual cases is
89. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on
Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297, 308-12 (1990).
90. Cross, supra note 70, at 1500-03; see also Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis
of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 682 (2002); Francis M. Allegra,
Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Judicial Review,
13 VA. TAX REV. 423, 461-73 (1994).
91. Cross, supra note 70, at 1499-1503, 1511.
92. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 287-315 (1999).
93. See id.
94. See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards,
14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 807-08 (2005) (discussing how repeated application of
laws makes rules more like standards and standards more like rules over time).
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so rare? One way is to move beyond the limits of the data we can
gather from the courts themselves and embrace other methodologies
such as behavioral experimentation. Experimentation makes it easy
to draft perfectly tailored, straightforward laws that can be used in a
variety of contexts. Moreover, it allows the empiricist to control legal
evolution; he or she can manipulate the number of sources of legal
authority, whether stare decisis applies, or whether there have been
prior applications of a statute, just to name a few. In Part III, I detail
my experimental design, which attempts specifically to implement
these methodological innovations.
2. Identifying Constrained Behavior
The study of law’s impact on judicial decisionmaking requires
empiricists to be very choosy about the behavior upon which they
focus. The behavior must be easy to identify without recourse to
subjectivity, and it is most desirable if it can be coded numerically.
The earliest empirical studies to make waves in the legal academy
focused on the judge’s vote, making it the dependent variable in their
analyses.95 This is not surprising. For one, outcomes are a salient
aspect of judicial decisionmaking, perhaps the most important
aspect. Indeed, it cannot be disputed that parties care quite a bit
about whether they prevail or not; it is even difficult to imagine that
they would care as much or more about the particular manner in
which the judge reached that result.96 Likewise, legal practitioners
focus on outcomes because precedential force is intimately tied to
them; all aspects of an opinion that are unnecessary to justify the
outcome are considered dicta and are nonbinding.97 Lastly, the
outcome-centric method is apt for empirical examination. Identifying
outcomes is straightforward—winners and losers are usually obvious
and binary—and in most cases the assignment of political or
95. See James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hanford, Measuring Legal Change: The
Reliability and Validity of Shepard's Citations, 53 POL. RES. Q. 327, 327-28 (2000) (“Since
the 1940s, with the publication of C. Herman Pritchett's The Roosevelt Court (1948),
scholars interested in courts have relied on judges’ final votes on the merits (i.e., whether
supporting the liberal or conservative position) as the primary indicator of judicial
outcomes. By examining individual judges' votes or collective court outcomes, this approach
has generated a considerable body of knowledge regarding the causal forces underlying
case dispositions.”) (citations omitted); see also GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 17
(1976); STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969);
JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1968).
96. This is not to suggest, of course, that they care only about winning. See Jeffrey
Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement System Treat People with
Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REV. 94, 103 (2006) (“People care about winning
and losing, but they are also influenced in the assessment of their experience by certain
key factors: giving ‘voice’ to their story, having an honest and unbiased decisionmaker,
being treated with dignity, and having a fair process of decision.”) (footnotes omitted).
97. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
205 (2007).
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ideological valences to those outcomes is uncontroversial.98 Thus, it
came to be that those engaged in quantitative study of judicial
decisionmaking adopted a sort of behaviorist approach: they assumed
that the judicial mind, and even the legal opinion springing
therefrom, ought to be treated as a black box; they focused instead
upon the various inputs bearing on the deciding judge and the single
output of the determination of the case.99
Indeed, out of hundreds of articles, I was able to locate only a
couple dozen published studies that use a different dependent
variable in the study of judicial decisionmaking.100 Not only is it the
methodological default,101 it is the approach used by several of the
authors in the preceding section that have studied judicial resources.

98. See JEFFERY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 243 (1993).
99. See Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions about Judicial
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1534 (2009).
100. See generally James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical
Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 65, 66-67
(1993); Lisa Baldez et al., Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (2006); Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for
Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y L. 251 (2002); Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay Rights
Cases, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1; Henry F. Fradella, A Content Analysis of Federal Judicial
Views of the Social Science ‘Researcher’s Black Arts,’ 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103 (2003); Peter J.
Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 546-649 (2002); Michael A. Perino, Law, Ideology, and Strategy in Judicial Decision
Making: Evidence from Securities Fraud Actions, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 497 (2006);
Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the
Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567
(1991); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical
Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L.
REV. 325 (2001); Glendon Schubert, Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in
Value Analysis, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 940; Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang,
Continuity and Change: Patterns of Litigation in the Courts, 1979-90, 45 STAN. L. REV. 115
(1992); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical
Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998); Joseph L. Smith & Emerson
H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
61 (2002); John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 445 (2004); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal
Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1105 (2004).
101. See Barry Friedman & Andrew J. Martin, Looking for Law in All the
Wrong Places: Some Suggestions for Modeling Legal Decisionmaking 35 (Ind.
Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law, Working Paper, Mar. 13, 2009), available at
http://adm.wustl.edu/media/working/f_and_m.pdf (“Finally, we mention the distinction
between the outcome of a case, and the opinion drafted by the court in that case. This is a
distinction that has drawn attention in the literature. Yet, many studies—hampered no
doubt by coding problems—continue to focus only on outcomes, as though that is all there
is to law.”) (citations omitted); Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
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The upside of the judicial vote is its straightforwardness and
simplicity, but that can also be its downside. A judicial vote says very
little about the deliberation and decisionmaking that led to it.
Indeed, the institutional model, one of the most important
advancements in the empirical study of judging, arose from the
observation that just because a judge voted counter-ideologically
does not necessarily mean that the judge’s decision arose out of
the perception that she was constrained by law against
voting ideologically.102
Institutionalists point out that the same result might be explained
by nonlegal and institutionally related desires such as career
advancement, avoidance of fatigue, diplomacy with copanelists,
minimizing the risk that her decision will be overturned, etc. One
study in this vein discovered that federal judges are more likely to
cite decisions authored by judges that have cited them.103 Another
found that judges were less likely to disagree with one another the
longer they served together.104 Several have found “panel effects:”
appellate judges sitting on panels vote differently depending upon
the preferences of the other judges with whom they sit. While an
internecine debate has arisen among empiricists over whether panel
effects arise from strategic motivations or from the persuasive
influence of panel members during deliberation about the correct
legal case outcome,, the disputants on both sides tend to rely on the
sole dependent variable of judicial vote.105
How do we improve the model? There are at least two obvious
ways: introduce dependent variables in addition to judicial vote into
the analysis and study judges in simpler contexts.
With respect to the former, the more reliable information that we
can gather about our judges, the easier it becomes to identify their
precise motivations or, at least, to rule out nonlegal motivations.
While identification sounds like a daunting task, there is reason to be
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1924 (2009); Jason J. Czarnezki, Voting and Electoral
Politics in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 337 (2003).
102. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross and Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 1437 (2001).
103. See Steven J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the
Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 92-93 (2008) (analyzing judge strategy in
citation); cf. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (analyzing
rational choice theory and judicial decisionmaking).
104. See Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 88, at 883-84 (this theory did not strictly use
dispositional votes or outcomes as a dependent variable, but also looked at agreement
between dyads of votes).
105. Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1321-24 (2009);
Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Response, Psychology, Strategy, and
Behavioral Equivalence, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 75 (2009); Derek J. Linkous &
Emerson H. Tiller, Response, Panel Effects, Whistleblowing Theory, and the Role of Legal
Doctrine, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 83 (2009).
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optimistic. Efforts to look beyond vote have been promising.106 And it
is becoming more feasible to analyze the content of text with the
assistance of computers, which preserve uniformity and objectivity.107
But just as we should not be tethered to judicial vote alone, we
should not be wedded to publicly available court documents. We may
choose to study judging in the laboratory—as I did here—which
allows us to gather vastly more information about the
decisionmaking process from subjects while maintaining our focus on
objective quantitative data. In the following section, I will detail my
choice to include an additional dependent variable, sense of
righteousness, into the model.
With respect to the latter, we must consider finding simpler
contexts to study. Complex institutions provide a multitude of potential
judicial motivations, some legal and some nonlegal. For example, by
analyzing judges that are not in panels, we can rule out the possibility
that counter-ideological voting is a strategic decision designed to
maximize the likelihood that an ideological outcomes will come about in
other cases. In this vein, the laboratory is also a wonderful resource
because laws, cases, judges, or institutions can be streamlined to better
isolate judicial motivations. The existence and composition of panel
members can be controlled with ease. The structure of review can be
customized to fit the needs of the research project.
III. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
First, I would like briefly to defend behavioral methodologies for
the study of judging, generally. Thereafter, I will discuss the contours
of the specific methodology used here.
106. Even early efforts sometimes utilized content-based dependent variables. See, e.g.,
Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and
Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W.
POL. Q. 297, 303-04 (1990) (using Shepard’s to find citation to Miranda or New York Times
to determine whether the lower court’s observation of precedent was in full compliance,
compliant and correctly anticipating future Supreme Court modifications of the landmark
decision, narrow compliance, or noncompliant and then setting that as dependent
variable); Andrew P. Morriss, Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions,
13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63 (2005); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998);
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005).
107. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media
Consolidation: An Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781, 805 (2009) (“One promising
approach to avoid the subjectivity of manual content analysis is automated computational
language processing. Over the past few years, rapid advances in computer science and
linguistics have enabled scholars to process text information in automated ways, thereby
facilitating statistical analysis of large amounts of news.”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu
Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and Should We Care?), 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1077 (2005); Brady Coleman, Lord Denning and Justice Cardozo: The Judge as PoetPhilosopher, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 485 (2001).
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While I endorse behavioral experimentation as a worthwhile
methodology for the study of judging, I admit that there might be
several ways to capture legal constraint through the popular
technique of statistically analyzing actual cases.108 If so, then that
approach would have much to recommend it. The results could be
statistically robust because of the large number of cases, there is a
good chance that it would have strong predictive power because the
data are from real legal actors in real legal cases, the project would
not be particularly costly, and it would not prove particularly difficult
to duplicate. There are several factors that stand in the way,
however. Real-world circumstances might demand an extraordinarily
high number of subjects in order to preserve generalizability. It is
therefore possible that comparisons would be made between cases
from very different time periods, from very different judges, with
very different facts, under very different areas of law, and from very
different regions.109 Using multiple regression could control the
influence of some of these factors,110 but doing so might come at the
cost of power in the analysis.111 While the problem is not
insurmountable,112 it remains a substantial issue. Lastly, it would be
difficult to get a reliable sense of the strength of the judge’s
ideological conviction. This would be especially tricky for
measurements before and after application of a rule or standard.
Certainly, great progress has been made in deciphering judicial
ideology,113 but the measures will always have an air of speculation
because published cases might not be accurate indications of judicial
ideology or preference.
108. For example, a model in which statutory rules and standards serve as
independent variables and time of decision is a dependent variable could potentially
capture them. Appellate court opinions could be coded to reflect whether the norms
considered therein are rules or standards, and they would be analyzed to determine the
time that it took to render a decision, such as the number of days between the date argued
and the date of decision.
It would be ideal if the database of cases was such that it allowed for a comparison of
the time of decision between a case in which a judge decided under a standard and a case
in which the same judge decided a nearly identical issue but under a rule. It is likely that
such comparisons would be very rare, indeed, and thus would likely be separated by many
months or years. In that circumstance, it would be quite important to account for
exogenous factors that might affect time, such as spikes in docket load.
109. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002)
(discussing frequency of such problems in empirical scholarship).
110. See Hall & Wright, supra note 84, at 119.
111. See H.M. Blalock, Jr., Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of
Multicollinearity, 42 SOC. FORCES 233 (1963) (“Whenever two supposedly independent
variables are highly correlated, it will be difficult to assess their relative importance in
determining some dependent variable. The higher the correlation between independent
variables the greater the sampling error of the partials.”).
112. Cf. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011).
113. The development of the Segal-Cover and Martin-Quinn scores have
improved prediction.
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Using behavioral simulations to gather data rather than using
case databases can alleviate many of these problems.114 The
laboratory allows for systematic control and randomization, neither
of which is feasible with real-world data.115 Moreover, it best meets
the challenge of using pure examples of rules and standards, finding
cases with identical facts, and controlling for exogenous factors that
might impact time. To be sure, the price comes in external validity;
generally speaking,116 the more unrealistic an experiment is, the less
generalizable its results.117 As mentioned, I used law students rather
than actual judges, who are often unavailable.118 Psychologists have
tested laboratory external validity and found that the results exhibit
surprisingly strong generality in some contexts.119 There is no
guarantee that judging is one of those contexts, of course.120
Having made the case for behavioral experimentation generally,
I will now turn to the merits of the particular research design
used here.
A. The Elements of Legal Constraint
A basic component of our faith in law’s efficacy is our assumption
that law constrains those subject to it.121 Law is written so that those
who interpret it will conclude that some conduct is legally ruled
out.122 Even if the interpreter would want to engage in a particular
conduct or would prefer to make that conduct legal, the law has the
capacity to make doing so much more difficult. That is, it has the
114. Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray, Simulation, Realism, and the Study of the
Jury, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 326 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005)
(“Unfortunately, a strength of one strategy is often a limitation of another. Regardless of
which method is used, researchers always face dilemmas in that they cannot (in a given
study) simultaneously maximize (1) realism (i.e., the concreteness of the behavioral
system), (2) precision of control and measurement, and (3) generality over actors,
behaviors, and situations.”).
115. See Tor, supra note 31.
116. Kerr & Bray, supra note 114, at 341 (noting that this is not a necessary relation).
117. See Tor, supra note 31.
118. See discussion supra Part I.
119. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, James J. Lindsay & Brad J. Bushman, Research in
the Psychological Laboratory: Truth or Triviality?, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL.
SCI. 3, 8 (1999) (“The obvious conclusion . . . is that the psychological laboratory is doing
quite well in terms of external validity; it has been discovering truth, not triviality.”).
120. Cf., e.g., K. Anders Ericsson , M.J. Prietula, M. J., & E. T. Cokely, The Making of
an Expert, 85 HARV. BUS. REV. 114-21 (2007) (showing influence of development in one’s
training on skills and expertise).
121. See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning: The Case of
Contract, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORE 25, 27 (Neil MacCormick & Peter
Birks eds., 1986) (“The concept of a system of precedent is that it constrains judges in some
cases to follow decisions they do not agree with.”); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 413 (Max Knight trans., 1967).
122. See Scott J. Shapiro, The Difference That Rules Make, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 33-62 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
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power to constrain them from bringing about the result that she
would otherwise prefer. Constraint can be complete; the judge might
decide the case in the direction that is at odds with what they would
prefer. Or constraint can be partial; the judge ultimately decides the
case in the direction she desires, but she had to work harder to
justify the decision because the law appears initially to favor ruling
in the other direction.
1. Conflict as a Prerequisite for Constraint
As discussed,123 the felt difficulty of a case comes from a
combination of perceived restrictions posed by the judge’s personal
and/or ideological preferences and the content of legal norms. As to
the former, the typical judge faces each new case with potentially
conflicting bases for decision. On the one hand, she seeks to follow
her oath of fidelity to the legal materials; and on the other hand she
seeks to do what is right, all things considered. The first demands
that the outcome be dictated by law, and the second demands, at
least in part, that the outcome be dictated by ideology or personal
morality.124 These bases for decision come into conflict when the
judge believes that the law directs her to decide the case in a
way that is at odds with her ideological, moral, or personally
preferred outcome.
Certain cases are more likely to instill a feeling of conflict in the
interpreting judge. For example, some factual scenarios are much
more likely to bring about considerable desires for particular case
outcomes than others. Likewise, some laws are much more likely to
call clearly for particular outcomes, which may be at odds with what
the judge desires. The first tendency is obvious. High profile cases or
cases involving hot button political issues tend to rouse the
passions.125 The second tendency is slightly more complex. Conflict is
most likely to occur when there is no real dispute about rule choice
(only one rule is clearly germane) or facts and the rule is such that
the ordinary interpreter could plausibly believe it has one
determinate meaning with respect to the facts of the case.126 Focusing
on the law portion of this combination, clear rules, as opposed to
vague standards, maximize the likelihood of conflict between fidelity
to law and ideological passion. In order to clarify the rule/standard

123. See supra Part I.B.
124. See Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 816 (1996) (“To say they experience role conflict is to say that it
would be problematic for them to exclude ideology because there is something in their
understanding of the judge's role that seems to push to include it.”).
125. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) 160 (1994).
126. See id.
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dichotomy, it will be helpful to consider the basic types of laws that
judges ordinarily encounter.
A Basic Account of Rules and Standards: When we picture a rule,
we tend to think of a speed limit or voting age requirement.127 When
we picture a standard, we tend to think of the reasonableness
requirement.128 If we put aside, for the moment, the judge’s feelings
about what the best outcomes in these cases would be in the absence
of law, we can imagine that a judge who considers only, say, speeding
cases that are governed by speed limit rules would have a fairly easy
job. We might even conclude that her job would be so mechanical that
it would be boring. On the other hand, if we visualize the same
passionless judge but this time her speeding cases are governed by a
reasonableness standard, then we would probably guess that her job
would be a great deal tougher, routinely forcing her to consider all of
the thorny circumstances before her. In this simplified context, the
guidance provided by the rule is welcome—it spares the judge
from having to do much thinking in reaching the straightforward
legal result.
A More Advanced Account of Rules and Standards: Our sense that
rules and standards make for easy or hard cases, respectively, fails to
account for the fact that a rule can make a case very hard for the
judge who has a strong objection to the result that would come from a
straightforward application of that rule. Conversely, a standard can
make it far easier for a judge to reach a desirable result than would a
conflicting rule. Thus, the mere addition of the judge’s preference to
our account of rules and standards flips our sense of difficulty
completely around. This is because the judge’s goal is different; the
difficulty for the judge comes from her desire to write a convincing
justification in support of her preferred outcome. That will take
“work,” which will become a key component of the model of
constraint. This kind of motivation is controversial yet commonplace;
politically charged cases are numerous in the appellate courts, and
such cases can motivate judges to attempt to reach outcomes that are
consistent with their own political ideologies, even if those outcomes
seem at first to conflict with the law.129

127. See, e.g., Jack F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer
Models as Applied to Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy
System, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1403, 1456 (1994) (“To demonstrate the point: an example
often given as a rule is ‘speed limit 55.’ ”).
128. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudence of Law and Economics: Why More
Economics is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 773, 805 (1996) (“The reach of common law rules is
attenuated, covering only the facts before the court, deciding issues on a case-by-case basis,
relying on standards (such as ‘reasonableness’) rather than on bright-line rules.”).
129. See, e.g., STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM 149 (2009).
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To be sure, there are numerous instances of “unselfconscious rulefollowing,” in which the potency of the law to regulate a dispute and
the judge’s attitude under the circumstances align to make the case
seem easy.130 Thereafter, the judge engages in a straightforward
deductive exercise. She is not even thinking about lawmaking. In this
case, law operates as a guide rather than as a constraint. While it is
possible that there is no struggle simply because it appears to the
judge that the case is easy due to the character of the law to be
applied, it is also possible that there isn’t a struggle because the
judges or parties to the case are very lazy, unmotivated,
unintelligent, or uninformed.131
In other cases, however, the judge is much more likely to feel
compelled to engage in some amount of work to reach the result she
prefers. Successful work permits the judge to convince herself that
she has written a persuasive, legally based opinion that manages to
reach the ideological result that she pleases.
2. “Work”: How Resources Interact with Constraint
The relationship between the law, the likelihood that the judge
will feel compelled to engage in “work,” and the amount of work that
the judge believes is necessary can be quite complex.132 But it is
almost always limited by the basic principle that specificity and
clarity make conflict possible whereas vagueness does not. Imagine
that there is only one law to consider in a case and that law is either
a pure rule or a pure standard. It is far more likely that the judge
will have to engage in complex interpretive techniques (work) under
the rule than under the standard because only the rule can restrict
the judge from reaching her desired outcome. It is difficult to see how
the judge would have trouble justifying her desired result under a
standard; as standards will likely make it seem as though the
legislator of the norm was content to delegate the choice of how to
regulate the conduct at issue to the judge, effectively allowing her to
utilize her discretion, including her ideological beliefs.133 In short,
there is neither an interpretive impediment nor a role conflict that
could slow the judge from reaching her desired outcome.
While this is far from an exhaustive account of work techniques, it
is enough to illustrate that there is a patterned relationship between

130. KENNEDY, supra note 125, at 160.
131. See id. at 170-71.
132. See id. at 169-70.
133. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1285 (2002) (“Indeed, sound arguments support a presumption
of implied delegated authority whenever Congress legislates in the form of
broad standards.”).
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the state of the law and the type and amount of work that the judge
perceives is necessary to justify a desired result.
Now that we have a basic understanding of the relationship
between legal constraint and work, we can consider how it might be
that restricting legal resources can enhance legal constraint.
Work takes time and energy. Duncan Kennedy offers an apt
phenomenological account:
[T]he judge has to allocate his time among the cases that
presently offer him chances to dispose [of] ideological stakes.
He has to calculate the probable payoff in terms of
convincing argument and the payoff in terms of ideological
significance. It is a hard choice when an apparently hard
case (an easy case for ideological work) offers a low payoff in
terms of ideological stakes, whereas an apparently easy case
that is obviously unjust offers a large payoff but might
require a lot of work, with no guarantee of success (in order
to overcome the initial sense of being constrained to ‘do the
wrong thing’).134
The supply of the resources necessary to engage in work, as this era
of austerity shows, can be in great or short supply. While the
specificity of law and the direction of ideological preference are the
factors in the likelihood that conflict will occur, the amount of
resources is a factor in the likelihood that this conflict will result in
constraint. Getting around a clear rule that conflicts with a desired
case outcome takes a lot of work. Sometimes, the work will pay off,
and the judge will reach the outcome she desires even if it first
appeared to be legally ruled out. Even when work is successful, the
rule can have an impact by making the judge’s work harder; it can
partially constrain her. If the work is hard for a judge under a
conflicting rule, then it is harder still when she is also short on time
or other necessary resources. The harder it is for a judge to work
around a rule, the more likely it is that the judge will follow the rule.
This is a probable explanation for the tentative finding in earlier
empirical studies that judges act more deferentially and
independently when they have fewer resources.135 Thus, theoretically,
resource reduction can be a means to make rules more effective. On
the other hand, vague laws, such as those with standards, pose no
challenge to the judge seeking to bring about her desired result. As a
consequence, the amount of resources will likely have no effect under
standards, being as they are weak constraints for motivated judges.

134. KENNEDY, supra note 125, at 166-67.
135. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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To summarize, legal rules have the capacity to bring about conflict
between what the judge perceives is the straightforward legal
outcome and what she believes ought to be the outcome. In such
cases, the constrained judge either gives into the law (“complete
constraint”)136 or she engages in work to write what she believes is a
convincing legal justification for the outcome she prefers (“partial
constraint”). The likelihood that work will produce such a
justification depends, in part, on the amount of resources available to
the judge. Fewer resources means a lower likelihood of success.
3. Legitimation and Delegitimation
When we consider constraint, then, the preference of the legal
interpreter is the counter-component. Since preference is so
important, it is worth studying the conditions under which law
changes judicial preference in its favor. If the law changes people’s
minds over time so that they no longer want to resist it (or do not
want to resist it as much), then it can fairly be said to have an
additional sort of constraining power—it legitimates the conduct that
it permits or mandates.
Many scholars claim that that law has a legitimation effect.137 On
this account, people may change their moral or ideological beliefs to
match those that are apparent in the law to which they are subject.
In cases of conflict, this can fairly be characterized as another form of
legal constraint because it is the result of a distinctly legal operation
that changes judicial decisionmaking in a direction intended by law.
As with conflict, for a law to have a legitimation effect, that law
would have to be sufficiently specific: it must suitably demarcate
legally desirable conduct that is different from what the judges
already desire. Thus, we can hypothesize that rules, as opposed to
standards, will produce this effect; standards are vague and fail to
substitute our values with law’s values.138
There is also a parallel with the role resources play in conflict, but
the benefits are inverted. We can hypothesize that when the
government manipulates the amount of resources it will provide to
judges, this change will have an impact on judges’ preferences. Most
likely, judges would feel slighted by the government, perhaps even
victimized. As a result, they might lose their motivation to be faithful
to the law and be less inclined to view the law that applies to the
cases before them as legitimate. Delegitimation might increase
136. She might also engage in work only ultimately to give in to the directive of law.
This is complete constraint as well.
137. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV.
355, 431-36 (1995).
138. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
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motivations to reach conclusions that the judges find desirable in
spite of legal directives. If so, it might overwhelm the initial increase
in constraint caused by stripping resources.
On the other hand, we can speculate that legitimation is most
likely to occur when the government provides the most pleasing
conditions for judges. If judges are given plenty of time to do work
and this nevertheless comes up short—the judges are unable to
convince themselves that their initially preferred outcomes are
legally justifiable—it would seem likely that they could become
convinced that the legal directive and its straightforward result have
more merit than they initially thought.
B. Specific Experimental Design
Having set forth the model, I now turn to my experimental
methodology for testing it.
Simply put, my experiment asked law students139 at three top New
England law schools to serve as mock judges in a simulated case. The
fact pattern of the case was ideologically salient and divisive—illegal
immigration—so that there would be a spread of ideological
strengths and directions.140 Despite its simulative nature, it had realworld effects because of a handful of monetary interventions that I
describe below.
The model requires that we be able to control and measure several
dimensions of judging. With respect to the subjects, themselves, we
must be able to identify the direction and strength of their
preferences for case outcomes in the absence of law. With respect to
the laws that the subjects must interpret, we must be able to control
their direction and specificity. Lastly, with respect to resources, we
must be able to control the amount available to each subject. I have
chosen to have a multiphase design: one phase that provides baseline
measures of the subjects’ preferences in the absence of law, and one
phase that provides the same measures in the presence of law. In the
latter phase (hereinafter “law phase”), I vary the amount of resources
available to the subjects so that I can isolate the effect of resource
limitation on law’s constraining power.

139. All students had completed a minimum of approximately one academic year
of study.
140. See Caroll Doherty, Attitudes Toward Immigration in Red and Blue,
PEW
RES.
CENTER
PUBLICATIONS
(May
9,
2006),
available
at
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/24/attitudes-toward-immigration-in-red-and-blue
(showing
roughly even distribution nationally of these that believe immigration is a very big
problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, and not a problem at all).
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1. The Two-Phase Design
The experiment had two phases, both of which were completed
online. The phases are distinguished by whether they have
potentially dispositive law or not; the law phase does, and the
other phase (hereinafter, “baseline phase”) does not. It is important
to note that the order in which the subjects received the two phases
was random, and there was a decay period141 between phases of
several weeks.
This multiphase design is important for a couple of reasons. First,
it allows within subjects analysis for certain measures. Rather than
having to divine what a hypothetical individual might do when he or
she encounters law from a comparison of the behavior of a law group
and baseline group, we are able to track how individual subjects
respond to law as they encounter each phase. This connects with the
second benefit: this experimental model provides an ideological
baseline and outcome for each subject. In other words, we get a
reliable indicator of how subjects would decide a case and how they
would feel when judging a particular case without law guiding their
actions. As a result, there is no need to use proxies to identify the
pre-existing ideology of a judge, which suffers from at least two
defects. First, if the proxy is exogenous—as it ought to be—then it
might not be reliable indicator of the judge’s particular ideology.
Second, even if it is representative of the judge’s ideology in most
instances, it risks failing to approximate the judge’s ideology with
respect to the facts of the case being analyzed. My methodology
eliminates these weaknesses by providing the subject’s baseline
outcome and a quantitative measure of his or her conviction with
respect to the exact issue analyzed.
Turning now to the details, I will draw a quick sketch of the
experiment’s two phases. A truncated and combined version of the
experiment script is included in the Appendix. It will be easiest first
to discuss what is held constant across the two phases and then to
discuss the differences.
2. The Elements Held Constant Across Phases
The essential constants were the fact pattern of the case, the
questions posed to the subjects, and the incentives structure.
The Facts of the Case: I presented subjects in both phases with the
same fact pattern:

141. The decay period, which was simply the amount of time between phases, was
designed to be just long enough that the students would forget the details of
their decisionmaking in their first phases, but not so long that we risked them changing
their ideologies.
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A citizen of a foreign nation ("the alien") has legally entered
our country on August 1, 2007 with a valid one-year work
visa issued that same day. He fled his home country after
being persecuted for his activism on behalf of the poor and
his anti-establishment political opinion. He had been
imprisoned for his political protests briefly in 2006, and he
and his family had been threatened by the local police force.
Worried for his personal safety, he obtained the visa and
arrived here. He could not speak English and was largely
ignorant of our laws regarding asylum, which is the
mechanism our country uses to allow aliens to reside here
who have been or fear being persecuted on account of their
race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or
political opinion. He began working in a restaurant shortly
after his arrival, but his employer never asked him to show
documentation indicating that he was a legal worker. He
was paid under-the-table. On July 31, 2008, his visa expired.
He continued to work at the restaurant, however, receiving
pay as usual for the next 13 months. At that point, a new
employee began work at the same restaurant. The new
employee soon learned of the alien's experiences in his home
country and of his expired one-year visa. The new employee
explained to the alien that staying here after the expiration
of the visa was illegal but that he might qualify for asylum
on the ground of past persecution for political opinion. She
suggested that the alien file a petition for asylum. The alien
retained a lawyer and filed a petition about 4 weeks later on
September 25, 2009. If granted asylum, the alien will have
the legal right to live here indefinitely. If denied asylum, he
will be removed from our country and transported back to
the country of his citizenship.
The Collected Data (Dependent Variables): Having reviewed the
facts, the subjects were then asked a series of questions from which I
collected data.
First, subjects were asked to decide whether or not to grant
asylum (although, as described below, the role that the subject plays
is different between phases). This provides both baseline values (in
the baseline phase) and experimental values (in the law phase) from
which we can draw comparisons and determine whether subjects
have been constrained by law: subjects that choose different
outcomes in the two phases (so long as the decision in the law phase
is the one that the law calls for) have been constrained142 by law.

142. More specifically, this is complete constraint. See supra Part III.A.2.
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Having made their decisions, I then ask them to note the strength
of their conviction that their answer was “the right thing to do” on a
numbered, 0-10 scale.143 This measure (hereinafter “conviction”) gives
us the ability to analyze a number of things. In the baseline phase, it
provides important baseline measures, allowing us to know with
some precision the intensity of their desire to reach outcomes that
are at odds with the legal directive, which further indicates whether
they will be likely to engage in work to get around the law. By
comparing the baseline and law phases, we are able to learn whether
the law has had a legitimating or delegitimating effect, depending on
whether the subject’s conviction is higher or lower, respectively, in
the law phase for those that were completely constrained.
Lastly, I asked them to write a justification for their decision. This
aspect of the research design allows resources variation to impact the
subject’s decisions and convictions; it is the writing of the
justification during the law phase that forces subjects to do work,
which requires resources according to the hypotheses described
below. Indeed, a big part of the accountability of judges comes from
the fact that they are expected to provide written justifications for
their decisions; it is what makes work difficult. It also increases the
realism of the simulation because it forces subjects to think through
their opinions on the case, minimizing the likelihood of careless or
random responses. Moreover, this design provides opportunities for
content analysis of opinions in future papers, although this content
was not analyzed here. Below, I describe the particulars of this
dimension of the experiment.
The Incentives Structure: I designed the reward/penalty system for
completion of the written justification to bring about potentially
conflicting desires—(1) the desire faithfully to interpret the law and (2)
the desire to bring about an ideologically satisfactory state of affairs.
As to the former, subjects were told that they would have the
opportunity to be entered into a contingent lottery. The contingency
was as follows: if subjects can convince one of two colleagues that
they adequately justified their result, they are eligible to win a
random drawing with a $300 prize. Subjects were told to write only
until they feel they have written a convincing justification.
Regardless of the phase of the experiment, this served to make sure
that students were motivated to put in effort. Most importantly,
however, when in the law phase, subjects will be motivated to write a
decision that they feel is legally supported.

143. Such scales, sometimes called “Likert-type Scales” are commonplace in behavioral
experimentation. See Rensis Likert, A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes, 140 .
ARCHIVES OF PSYCH. 1, 1-55 (1932).
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As to the latter, I told subjects that their decision would result in
the payment of $2 to actual charitable organizations whose mission
was consistent with the result they choose. More specifically, I told
them that a decision to grant asylum would result in payment to
Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees, a non-profit
and pro-immigration organization.144 On the other hand, a decision to
deny asylum would result in a payment to the Federation for
American Immigration Reform, a non-profit organization that is
critical of current immigration policies.145 While these stakes are
lower than if this case described a real immigration hearing, they are
large enough for students to care about the real-world consequences
of the decision that they are asked to make and therefore make the
experiment more representative of actual judging.
3. The Differences between the Phases
The primary difference between the law phase and the baseline
phase is that the law phase contained a handful of elements that
were not included in the above description. First, the law, as its name
implies, contained a legal variable: subjects were given either a pure
rule or a pure standard. Second, it contained a resources variable:
subjects were given either a very strict time limit or no time limit at
all. Whereas subjects in the baseline phase do not play a role (we
want to learn what their personal preferences are), they are asked to
serve as simulated judges in the law phase. It will be helpful to
provide a bit more detail about the mechanics of the law phase.
The Legal Rule Condition: The subject under this condition is
exposed to a bright-line legal rule. In particular, the rule provides a
deadline for the filing of asylum after the expiration of the visa,
which the immigrant has not met. A plain reading of the rule would
permit a simple deductive solution—namely, all successful
applications for asylum must file before the deadline, the immigrant
here did not file before the deadline, therefore he is not a successful
applicant. This is the outcome that would be produced by
straightforward adjudication. Other outcomes would require indirect
adjudication and therefore are more difficult to reach convincingly.
As a result, the resource restriction described below should prevent
some subjects from making otherwise preferable decisions. That is to
say that it should take work.
The Legal Standard Condition: The subject under this condition is
exposed to a pure standard. In particular, the standard requires that
144. See
GRANTMAKERS
CONCERNED
WITH
IMMIGRANT
&
REFUGEES,
http://www.gcir.org/about (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
145. See FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/site/
PageNavigator/about/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
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immigrants file within a reasonable time after the expiration of the
visa. Unlike the rule, it does not permit a simple deductive solution,
and the lack of clarity should make it easy for the subject to decide as
he or she prefers, which ought to be the same decision that he or she
chose or will choose in the baseline phase. The subject should be able
to reach the same decision in both the law and the baseline phases
regardless of the resource restriction described below.
The Resources Limited Condition: Subjects under this condition
must write their opinions in two minutes or less. Judging takes time,
and engaging in judicial work even more so. Piloting revealed that
the vast majority of subjects took over two minutes to complete their
justifications. Accordingly, I set the resource limit at a time that
would make it challenging for those who seek to engage in work to
justify a decision that does not comply with a plain reading of the
legal rule.
The Resources Unlimited Condition: Subjects under this condition
have unlimited time to complete their legal opinions. In particular,
they are told that they make take as long as they would like to write
a convincing answer.
These conditions are combined together in the following two-bytwo matrix:
Rule
No
Time
Limit
Time
Limit

Standard

Rule/Unlimited

Standard/Unlimited

Rule/Limited

Standard/Limited

C. How the Design Alleviates the Problems of the Existing
Model of Legal Constraint
Having sketched out the basic mechanics of the experiment, it is
now possible to explain how the design addresses the weaknesses of
the existing model for legal constraint.
1. Providing a Straightforward Legal Directive
Recall that one of criticisms of the dominant methodological
approach to the empirical study of judging was that scholars do not
often identify the straightforward146 legal outcome in the case before
146.

See discussion supra Part II.
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each judge that they study, or even whether such an outcome exists
at all. In that section, I argued that locating or utilizing simpler legal
norms was one way to identify such outcomes without threatening
scientific objectivity.
With that in mind, I adopted a framework that allows me to
control the legal norms that apply to the cases that I study. In this
study, the legal norms are paradigm examples of rules and
standards. Thus, the rule is written so as to provide a facially obvious
directive that interpreters can apply straightforwardly to the case
before them. I designed the standard so as to provide the minimal
amount of constraint possible without sacrificing its resemblance to
actual laws. The rule sets a clear time limit for the filing of asylum
applications, and the alien in this case missed that deadline by
several months.147 Thus, a straightforward application of the rule
would bar the grant of asylum. The standard, on the other hand, is
included as a control condition to reproduce the results of the
baseline phase. This means that the standard is not expected to have
an effect—it is something of a legal placebo—so it will serve as a
comparator for the rule, which we can understand as the true “legal”
intervention under the Razian approach. Joseph Raz famously
argues that laws with moral criteria are equivalent to asking people
to do what they ought to do on the balance of all reasons; that is, it
directs them to do what they would have done if there were no law on
the issue.148 This norm content need not specifically be moral either.
It could be any content that is merit-evaluative.149 Put differently, the
content of the norm depends on the reasons for creating the norm in
the first place; it is “content-dependent.”150
The distinction between rules and standards tracks this
principle.151 Rules generally do not force those interpreting them to
147. It is important to be clear that I do not mean to equate “straightforward outcome”
with legally correct or right outcome It is at least arguable that moral requirements have
been incorporated into all law through, say, invocations of equity or through the operation
of natural law. From this vantage point, it could be that the moral and, therefore, legally
correct outcome, is the one in which the alien is provided safe haven through asylum.
148. While Raz takes this exclusive position regardless of whether the norm is a
primary or secondary rule, some exclusive legal philosophers offer arguments that focus on
the particular secondary rule of the rule of recognition. See generally Scott J. Shapiro, Law,
Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127 (2000).
149. See John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 223 (2001).
150. See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 296 n.35 (1992).
151. It tracks the distinction but not perfectly; the term “standard” is overinclusive for
Raz’s category of content-dependent norms. There are standards that are more contentindependent than “do the moral thing” or “do justice” or “be reasonable,” all of which are
basically equivalent to "make the best decision, all things considered" under the Raz model.
Indeed, they are more so than the last three segments of the Fifth Amendment, all of which
have been called standards despite having different, and increasing, levels of contentdependence: “nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”
“nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;” “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE
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reconsider the reasons that gave rise to their creation, providing
independent and clear guidelines for dispute resolution. Recall the
speed limit example. A judge that considers whether to impose a
penalty based on the speed of an automobile is directed to exclude all
reasons from her deliberation that were within the scope of the
reasons for adopting the speed limit in the first place. She cannot
consider whether the driving is more fun when it is done at excessive
speeds or whether it might sometimes be safer to drive more quickly;
such reasons were within the scope of consideration when the rule
was enacted. This exclusion regulates her deliberation and makes it
much easier for her to conclude that, because this driver exceeded the
speed limit by 15 miles per hour, he deserves the legal fine. Now
consider a legal standard. Imagine a law that tells all citizens to be
“generally fair and equitable” in contractual relations. This norm
directs subjects to resolve contractual disputes using the very
reasons that they would have considered in deciding to follow that
rule in the first place. The judge who carefully considers how to
resolve a contractual dispute would presumably have considered
those very reasons in the absence of law under the Razian view. The
right thing to do on the balance of all reasons must itself be fair and
equitable, so the law fails to do anything that would justify its
insertion into the deliberation of the judge. It does as much work as a
law that says, consider all the reasons that you would have
considered anyway.152
Because standards function such that there should be no
difference between the results they produce and what an all-thingsconsidered determination would produce, standards have the power
to serve as a control condition while analyzing rules. Standards
should duplicate the results of the baseline phase of the experiment.
In short, paradigm examples of rules and standards serve as
MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 31 (2006) (characterizing the first provision as a standard);
Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Posnerian Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
39, 39 n.2 (1987) (characterizing the second provision as a standard). It could very well be
the case that one or more of these provisions are content-independent under Raz’s
understanding. Because the experiment described infra employs a norm for its standard
condition that is clearly both a standard as well as content-dependent, we need not be
concerned with this inaccuracy.
152. In their classic work, Hart and Sacks describe this very characteristic: “A
standard may be defined broadly as a legal direction which can be applied only by making,
in addition to a finding of what happened or is happening in the particular situation, a
qualitative appraisal of those happenings in terms of their probable consequences, moral
justification or other aspect of human experience.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
140 (1994). Kathleen Sullivan more recently defined standards in nearly identical terms,
stating, “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back
into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation.”
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 58 (1992).
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independent variables in the experiment for the sake of allowing
isolation of their differential constraining effect. Because the
experiment exposes half of the subjects to rules and the other half to
standards, it is capable of showing how these legal norm types cause
different constraining behaviors.
Admittedly, one limitation of this study is that I am only testing
rules and standards in a single case. Before any firm conclusions can
be drawn about the differential constraining effect of rules and
standards, at the very least a variety of cases ought to be tested. As
explained, this was a good starting place.
2. Reducing Problems of Strategic Behavioral Equivalence
Recall that existing studies on the relationship between resources
and judging suffer from the fact that they do not have the ability to
verify that voting counter-ideologically was the result of law
constraining the voting judge rather than some other basis. Here,
this problem of behavioral equivalence has been alleviated. First,
many of the alternative strategic explanations for counter-ideological
voting have been eliminated: there is no panel and the decision is
one-shot, so the judge’s behavior cannot be explained using the
typical institutionalist critiques. In short, the streamlined nature of
the laboratory allows us to rule out alternative explanations based on
the notion that the subject is acting in a way that is best for his or
her ideological agenda in the long run. As a result, it becomes
reasonable to conclude that a decision to choose the opposite outcome
from the one preferred in the baseline phase represents a decision to
be constrained by the law.
Moreover, we have the ability to screen out subjects that do not
have strong enough passions to produce conflict under the rule, so we
can be more confident that the counter-ideological voting we are
seeing is hard-earned rather than the result of confusion, lack of
effort, or changed ideological preferences between phases. For this
reason, I screen out those under rules that did not have a conviction
of five or higher in the baseline phase.
Likewise, we are able to rule out other behavioral equivalencies
that are particularly problematic in the study of sharply limited
resources. It might be worrisome that judges are voting ideologically
because without adequate resources they become confused from the
time pressure, thereby ignoring both law and ideology, and make
decisions that are simply random. Of course, given the
straightforwardness of the case and the fact that pilot testing
revealed that the amount of time provided under the
resources limited condition was enough to make an intentional
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determination,153 this is quite unlikely. Nevertheless, by using
standards as a control condition, we can rule out this possibility and
provide evidence that the specificity of the legal directive in the rule
or the resource condition, or the combination thereof, was the factor
making a difference. In other words, we can provide further evidence
that it is legal constraint doing the work.
3. Providing a Measure of Legitimation through Conviction
One of the benefits of using behavioral experimentation is that it
permits the adoption of new and improved dependent variables. As
described above, I use a numbered scale to monitor the subject’s level
of conviction that the result he or she reached was righteous under
the different experimental conditions. The two-phase design allows
us to see how the intervention of law changed their sense of
righteousness. In this respect, the baseline phase provides a
behavioral demonstration as well as a measure of intensity regarding
the subjects’ views on the legitimacy of a specific state of affairs
independent of dispositive law.154 In comparison, the law phase shows
how that sense of legitimacy changes in the face of law. Using the
measure of conviction in the law phase, we can see how subjects are
more or less likely to reach outcomes under law that are different
than what they would prefer under the baseline condition. Just as
important, however, we also learn in the law condition how reaching
either a law-guided or ideologically-guided resolution changes the
subject’s conviction that she did the right thing in bringing about
that outcome. As a result, we can identify the conditions under which
following the dictates of law—even when they conflict with the
judge’s ideology—actually increases the subject’s conviction in the
result. This phenomenon must be understood as a legitimation effect.
Of particular importance to the study of limited resources, we can
see whether limiting resources might affect judges’ motivation to
follow and apply the law straightforwardly. A delegitimation effect
might warn that judges will be less likely to follow their oaths of
fidelity or might explain why judges are beginning to quit the job.
D. Hypotheses
Now that that basic mechanics of the experiment are clear, it is
possible to articulate hypotheses. There are certainly more
hypotheses than those included below, but those included are
153. While the vast majority of subjects in the pilot who were unlimited in the time it
would take them ended up taking longer than two minutes, many did not exceed that time
by a large amount. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
154. See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L.
REV. 379, 426 (1983).
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sufficient to highlight the primary indicators of legal constraint and
to set forth the most essential predictions regarding the interaction
between legal constraint and resources.
As a threshold matter, we expect that standards will produce
results that are the same as those produced in the baseline phase,
making them a suitable control condition. We will not see a
significant difference between the decisions or the level of conviction
under standards.155
With respect to the interaction between rules and resources, the
hypotheses are more specific. First, for the subjects with desires that
permit conflict with the legal rule156 (that is, for those that support
granting asylum in the baseline phase), we can expect that a higher
proportion of subjects will change decisions to deny asylum under the
rule when resources are limited than under all of the other
conditions. With respect to conviction, we can expect that subjects
under the rule will experience greater changes than those under the
standard. The standard should do nothing to change conviction.
Under the rule, there should be significant changes, and the direction
of these changes should depend upon whether one was completely
constrained by law or not. This term, “complete constraint” will be
used often in the results and analysis sections, as will be some
related terms, like “not completely constrained” and “partially
constrained,” which are listed below in descending order of their use:

155. As between rules and standards, I generally expect that the rules will exhibit
constraining power on outcomes and the standards will not. But making basic hypotheses
regarding how all judges under rules will compare to all judges under standards is not the
goal here—this study is designed to test the interaction between the specificity of law and
the availability of resources. Accordingly, I am most interested in seeing whether
constraint is increased by cutting resources and how that constraint, or lack thereof, affects
judges’ strengths of conviction.
156. There are a series of rule assistance-related hypotheses that could have been
made, many of which are the inverse of the rule constraint-related hypotheses. Too few of
the subjects tested supported denying asylum in the law phase to permit statistical testing.
This comes as little surprise—there aren’t many conservatives in the Northeast.
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Necessary Conditions

Completely Constrained

(1) Subject Granted Asylum in
Baseline but (2) Denied Asylum
in Law Phase

Not Completely Constrained

(1) Subject Granted Asylum in
Baseline and (2) Granted Asylum
in Law Phase

Partially Constrained

An indirect measure estimating
the proportion of subjects that
would likely have been completely
constrained had they been subject
to resource restriction, obtained
by calculating the difference
between the proportion of Not
Completely Constrained Subjects
in the Time Limited and Time
Unlimited Rule Groups

Those subject to resource restriction who were not completely
constrained (they decided to grant asylum in both the law and
baseline phases) should experience higher drops under resource
restriction than under no resource restriction on the theory that they
were rushed and therefore not as confident that they reached the
right outcome. Likewise, those subjects that were completely
constrained and were subject to resource restriction ought to
experience larger drops in their strengths of conviction than those
who were not restricted. The difference here should be the most
dramatic of all the comparisons, however, because of the possibility
that resource unlimited subjects will experience a legitimation
effect—an increase in conviction. They chose to side with a counterideological result even though they had all the time that they would
need to engage in work to get around the rule. In short, they had
every opportunity to try to get around the rule but chose to follow it
anyway. It is thus possible that they became more convinced of its
merit. On the other hand, we can expect that those who were
constrained and had their resources limited will experience
considerably larger drops in their conviction than all other
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combinations under the rule. They were given almost no opportunity
to work around the rule, and this is likely to embitter them. As a
result, it appears likely that there would be a pronounced
delegitimation effect.
While these predictions might seem complicated, they are
designed to reflect the principle that resource limitation will increase
the constraining power of only those laws that have specific
directives, but this increase in power has the cost of high
delegitimation. Traditionally, it is useful for empirical papers to state
a series of hypotheses written in the “null” format, making clear
exactly the kind of statistical evidence that will disconfirm them.
Anticipated results mean that the hypotheses live another day,
potentially to be disconfirmed in future experiments. Here, the
intended audience is broader than just empirical scholars, so the
preceding discussion has been written in ordinary prose. To
maintain precision, however, specific null hypotheses will be included
before their relevant portion of the statistical analysis in the
following section.
IV. RESULTS
The number of subjects that completed both phases of the
experiment totaled 132. Of those, only 10 chose to deny asylum in the
baseline phase, and they were omitted because the rule would assist
them rather than constrain them (they chose to deny asylum in the
baseline). Lastly, a small portion of the subjects that were in the
legally constrainable group did not exhibit strong enough conviction
scores in the baseline phase to behave in a predictable fashion under
the experimental conditions.157 This left 114 subjects for the
remaining hypotheses.
Except where otherwise indicated, I performed a multiple analysis
of variance test (MANOVA) with the independent variables of type of
law (rule or standard) and type of time (limited or unlimited) and the
dependent variables of law position, law conviction, baseline decision,
baseline conviction, as well as change in decision and conviction.
The multivariate tests returned a significant result, so I continued
to analyze the between-subjects effects. The main effect of the type of
law—rule or standard—was significant with respect to the law phase
decision F(1, 110) = 7.348, MSE = .903, p < .01. The main effect of
type of time available—limited or unlimited—was significant with
respect to law phase decision; F(1, 110) = 4.252, MSE = .522, p < .05;
to law phase conviction F(1, 110) = 5.502, MSE = 29.518, p < .05;
and change of conviction F(1, 110) = 7.427, MSE = 43.139, p <.001.
157. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (screening out those lower than 5).
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The interaction between the two factors was significant with respect
to law phase conviction F(1, 110) = 4.533, MSE = 24.318, p <.01. Posthoc analysis, using a Bonferroni correction factor, was conducted.
These results are discussed in more detail below. Before considering
them, it will be helpful to provide a summary of the most basic
descriptive statistics:
Treatment

Percentage
Completely
Constrained
(% Denying Asylum
in Law Phase)
0%

Percentage Change
in
Strength
of
Conviction
(Law Phase minus
Baseline)
.14

Standard/Limited
(N=36)
Rule/Unlimited
(N=28)

10%

-.22

17%

.43

Rule/Limited
(N=28)

32%

-1.39

Standard/Unlimited
(N=22)

The tested hypotheses are numbered and italicized.
1. For subjects in the standard group, a significant proportion of
subjects will change their decisions between the two phases of
the experiment.
2. Subjects in the standard group will experience overall significant
changes in their strengths of conviction between the phases of
the experiment.
These hypotheses were disconfirmed. As predicted, there was no
significant difference between the baseline phase and law phase
measures of conviction (Table 1) or decision (Table 2) for the legal
standards group. Nor was there a significant difference under the
standard when comparing the decisions of the subjects between the
two phases.
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Table 1:

Standard
Subjects
under
Baseline
Standard
Subjects
under Law

Mean
Strength of
Conviction
7.03

Stan. Dev.

N

Sig.

2.25

58

>.1

6.94

2.09

58

Table 2:

Std.
Delta
Decision

Mean
-6.9%

Stan. Dev.
.26

N
58

Sig.
>.1

3. Subjects in the rule group will not experience changes in their
strengths of conviction between the phases of the experiment.
4. Subjects in the rule group will not experience higher changes in
their strengths of conviction between the phases of the
experiment than will subjects in the standard group.
5. Subjects in the rule group who are completely constrained will not
experience larger drops in their strength of conviction between
the non-law phase and the law phase than subjects in the rule
group who are not completely constrained.
These hypotheses could not be disconfirmed. With respect to strength
of conviction, there was no significant difference between those that
were under rules in the law phase and those that were under rules in
the baseline phase (Table 3), between rules and standards (Table 3),
and between those completely constrained under rules and those that
were not (Table 3).
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Table 3:

Baseline
Strength
of
Conviction
under Rule
Law Strength
of Conviction
under Rule
Type of Law

Rule
Standard

Not
Completely
Constrained
under Rule
Completely
Constrained
under Rule

Mean
7.04

Std. Dev.
2.35

N
56

Sig.
>.1

6.55

2.68

56

>.1

Mean
Change in
Conviction
-.43
-.09

Stan. Dev.

N

Sig.

3.09
1.83

56
58

>.1

Mean
Change
in
Conviction
-0.24

Stan. Dev.

N

Sig.

2.08

41

>.1

-1.73

4.78

15

This is not particularly surprising. For the reasons discussed in Part
III, differences in the direction and magnitude of conviction depend
on the combination of whether one was subject to a rule and whether
there was resource restriction.
6. For subjects in the rule group, subjects will not change their
decisions between the two phases of the experiment.
7. There will be no significant difference between the proportion of
completely constrained subjects under the standard and the
proportion under the rule.
These hypotheses could not be disconfirmed, although the trends
were in the anticipated directions. Indeed, rules completely
constrained 20 percent more subjects than did standards (6.5% under
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the standard and 26.8% under the rule). A higher number of subjects
might have yielded significant results and, as discussed below,
separating out the time limited subjects yields significant results.
8. The subjects in the rule group under the time limit will not have a
higher proportion of completely constrained subjects than
the subjects in the standard group under no time limit
(control group).
9. The subjects in the standard group under the time limit will have
a different proportion of subjects that are completely
constrained than the subjects in the standard group under no
time limit.
These hypotheses were disconfirmed. Critically, only subjects that
were under both a rule and resource restriction showed significantly
higher rates of complete constraint than the control group of subjects
under the standard that did not have their time limited (Table 4).
This finding parallels and builds upon the results in prior studies of
the effect of resource restriction, which found that subjects exhibited
more deference or independence when time was limited. The
similarity to actual judge practice goes some distance toward allaying
concerns that this simulated case lacks external validity.
Furthermore, we can be confident that this difference is the result of
legal constraint because we do not see this effect when a standard is
substituted for the rule. Indeed, there was no significant difference in
decisions between time-limited subjects and time-unlimited subjects
under the standard (Table 5).
Table 4:
Group

Rule Limited
Standard
Unlimited

Percentage
Completely
Constrained
32%

N

Sig.

28

.01

0%

22
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Table 5:
Group

Percentage
Completely
Constrained

N

Sig.

Standard
Limited
Standard
Unlimited

11%

36

>.1

0%

22

10. The subjects in the rule group under the time limit will not have a
higher proportion of completely constrained subjects than the
subjects in the rule group under no time limit.
Interestingly, this hypothesis could not be disconfirmed, although its
independent importance is lessened by the finding that only rules
with time limitation differed from the control condition.
11. Subjects in the rule group who are subject to a time limit will not
exhibit larger drops in their strength of conviction between the
non-law phase and the law phase than subjects in the rule
group who are not subject to a time limit.
12. Subjects in the standard group who are subject to a time limit will
exhibit larger drops in their strength of conviction between the
non-law phase and the law phase than subjects in the
standard group who are not subject to a time limit.
These hypotheses have been disconfirmed. As predicted, those
subjects that were under a combination of rules and time limitation
experienced on average significantly larger drop in conviction in the
law phase than subjects under rules that had unlimited time (Table
6). Note that there was again no significant difference under the
comparable standard control condition (Table 7).
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Table 6:
Group158

Rule Limited
Rule
Unlimited

Mean
Change
in
Conviction
-1.39
.43

Std. Dev.

N

Sig.

3.17
2.77

28
28

.016

Mean Change
in Conviction
-.22

Std. Dev.

N

Sig.

1.71

36

.14

2.03

22

Table 7:
Group
Standard
Limited
Standard
Unlimited

>.1

Yet, even this data risks understating the size of the effect. If the
results are further broken down to compare subjects that were
completely constrained to those that were not, the difference grows
even starker. Those that surrendered to the rule under the time limit
saw a precipitous drop in their conviction of 4.3 points; whereas those
who surrendered with no time limit saw a substantial increase in
their conviction of 2.2 points. Because these subgroups are small, this
finding is not statistically significant, but the trend is noteworthy.
These findings support the conclusion that there is an interaction
between the occurrence of complete constraint and resource limitation.
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Before moving on to policy implications and avenues for further
study, it is necessary to discuss what these results mean. Generally
speaking, the independent variables of legal norm-content type
(introducing a rule or a standard) and of resource limitation type
(limiting time or not) produced complimentary effects.
Rules and standards behave largely as we expect them to. While
we might have expected a higher percentage of subjects to be
constrained under rules, our intuition that only rules would, under
158. To assist the reader, this measure already calculates the change in conviction. I
noted earlier that the more traditional between subjects comparison also returned
significant results. In this case the final conviction of Rule Limited (M = 5.61, SD = 2.77)
was significantly different from that of Rule Unlimited (M = 7.5, SD = 2.27).
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any circumstances, exhibit the ability completely to constrain
subjects received empirical support. Under time limitation, rules
appear to have forced a significant number of subjects to reach the
decision called for in a straightforward application of the rule even
though those subjects would have chosen otherwise in the absence of
law. Likewise, the addition of resource limitation had a profound
impact on the power of rules to change strengths of conviction but
had little impact on standards. In short, resource limitation appears
to make rules behave more like rules.
A. Threshold Findings: Rules Versus Standards, Generally
Recall that a unique dimension of this experiment is that it
provided both (1) a methodology for distinguishing between
constraining and non-constraining legal norms using a popular
conceptual distinction and (2) empirical support for incorporating
that distinction into statistical analysis of judicial decisions where
possible. Recall further that the simplest account of rules and
standards is that rules constrain and standards do not.
Looking at the results here, standards did not produce
statistically significant differences on decisions or on strength of
conviction. Rules159 fared a bit better, producing significant
differences when assisted with time limitation. Even taking all of the
rule groups together, rules completely constrained 20% more subjects
than standards did (6.5% under the standard and 26.8% under the
rule) although this did not reach significance. The following tables
(Table 8 (Decision) and Table 9 (Conviction) detail these results:
Table 8: Percentage Constrained by Subgroup

Standard

Rule

Time Unlimited
N = 22
% Completely
Constrained = 0
N = 28
% Completely
Constrained = 25

Time Limited
N = 36
% Completely
Constrained = 11
N = 28
% Completely
Constrained = 32

159. Hereinafter, the discussion of rules considers only constraining rules, as no testing
occurred with respect to the rule assistance hypotheses.
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Table 9: Changes in Conviction by Subgroup

Standard

Rule

Time Unlimited

Time Limited

N = 22
Delta Conviction = .1364
Std. Dev .= 2.03

N = 36
Delta Conviction = -.2222
Std. Dev. = 1.71

Not Completely
Constrained

Completely
Constrained

N = 22
Delta
Conviction =
.14
Std. Dev. = 2.03

N=0

Not
Completely
Constrained
Completely
Constrained
N = 32
N=4
Delta
Delta
Conviction =
Conviction =
-.19
-.50
Std. Dev. =
Std. Dev. =
1.38
3.79
N =28
Delta Conviction = -1.39
Std. Dev. = 3.17

N = 28
Delta Conviction = .43
Std. Dev. = 2.77
Not Completely
Constrained

Completely
Constrained

N = 22
Delta Conviction =
-.05

N=6
Delta
Conviction
= 2.17

A visualization
more apparent.

of

these

results

will

Not
Completely
Constrained
N = 19
Delta
Conviction =
0

make

the

Completely
Constrained
N=9
Delta
Conviction =
-4.33

differences
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Likewise, the overall change in conviction was considerably
greater under rules; it made almost no difference to standards but
brought about a half point of change to those subject to rules (-.07
under the standard and -.48 under the rule).
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Generally speaking, then, subjects who thought that granting
asylum was the right outcome despite the immigrant’s delayed filing
continued to think so even after learning that the law limited asylum
to those that filed within a “reasonable” amount of time. These
findings support the notion that standards are, at best, a weak
constraint on judges. It would, of course, be premature to conclude
that adjudication under standards reduces to nothing more than an
all-things-considered determination, as the views of Joseph Raz and
other exclusive legal positivists would suggest.160 Some subjects,
although a statistically insignificant number, changed their positions
under the standard.161
Whereas standards appear ineffectual, rules are certainly doing
something: they do a relatively good job producing complete
constraint. Yet, they do not correlate with statistically significant
differences on conviction without additionally considering whether
the subjects were constrained or whether they were subjected to
resource limitation.
B. Advanced Findings: Decisions
Recall that I adopted the experimental intervention of time
limitation to isolate the “work” that subjects engage in to get around
a constraining rule. Since work requires resources, including time,
restricting resources should reduce an individual subject’s ability to
engage in work and, in turn, her ability to reach a convincing yet
ideologically driven outcome. The results indeed show that the
combination of limiting time and imposing a rule exhibited the most
powerful constraint on our subjects. When we view the results
together, showing both of our interventions (law and time) in action,
it is apparent that our strongest combination—rule and time
limitation—was the one that significantly constrained subjects
compared to the weakest group—standard and time unlimited.
160. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
161. It might be tempting to write off these outlying judges on the suspicion they
independently changed their ideological position on immigration in the interim between
phases or that they were simply confused. There is reason to doubt both of these
explanations, however, and to believe instead that the standard itself was the source of the
change. First, the judges did not have low conviction scores in either the baseline phase or
the law phase; they felt almost as strongly about the righteousness of granting asylum as
even those that stuck to their guns under the rule. Second, they were notably uniform;
each of them maintained the exact same conviction throughout. This consistency suggests
a lack of confusion.
For some reason, these outlying judges appear to have interpreted the legal standard
as a strong constraint on their ability to reach the ideologically favorable result. While
further study of this behavior is necessary, it could very well be that there are judges that
seek to be constrained by legal norms that most of us would consider weakly constraining
or not constraining at all. Such people were not numerous enough to change the overall
picture for standards, however.
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Thirty-two percent of the subjects under the strongest combination
changed positions while none of the subjects under the weakest
combination did:

It is notable that the other combinations trend as anticipated; the
rule-unlimited condition produced about half of the completely
constrained subjects as did the rule-limited condition, followed by the
standard-limited condition at an even lower amount. But it is most
important that the significant relation is the one between the
strongest
and
weakest
combinations
(Rule/Limited
vs.
Standard/Unlimited). This supports the notion that resource
limitation generally, and time limitation specifically, enhances the
differences between the constraining power of rules and standards.
The finding that time limitation acts as a constraint enhancer in
this context is important for several reasons. First, it lends empirical
support to the account of constraint in which a considerable number
of judges engage in work to get around the straightforward directives
of law but require resources to do so successfully.162 This relates to a
162. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.

2012]

JUDGING UNDER PRESSURE

985

second point: it provides evidence that partial constraint—a
phenomenon that has been ignored by previous studies—can be
turned into complete constraint by controlling resources. Third, as
mentioned, it parallels the findings of studies that used real court
data to show resource restriction increases deference and
independence, thus providing external validity to the design and
implementation of this simulation. Lastly, it shows that the benefits
of resource restriction depend on the specificity of the laws that the
subjects interpret. We can speculate that the higher the proportion of
standard-like laws before the judges in a court, the lower the impact
of resource restriction will be on legal constraint.
C. Advanced Findings: Strength of Conviction,
Legitimation and Delegitimation
The story for strength of conviction mirrors the story for
decisions—specifically, it takes resource restriction for the
rules/standards distinction to become meaningful. When looking at
all of the rule subjects and all of the standard subjects together, the
overall change in conviction trended higher under the rules as it
made almost no difference under the standards (-.48 under the rule
and -.07 under the standard), but this difference was not enough to
be significant.
The statistically significant differences emerge, however, once we
separate the subjects into their time limited and unlimited subgroups
under each condition. The presence of time limitation correlated with
a precipitous drop in strength of conviction with rule subjects (-1.39)
compared to a moderate gain in conviction when it was not present
(+.43). There was virtually no change in conviction under the
standard regardless of whether time limitation was present. The
following graph visualizes the relation:
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Why would the presence or absence of a strong time limit impact
the subjects’ strength of conviction under the rule? The simplest
explanation could be that it takes time to be convinced of the wisdom
of the law’s position when that position is at odds with the subject’s
baseline position. Without available time, the subjects are left to
prefer their conflicting baseline position and, thus, experience a drop
in conviction when they feel compelled to decide pursuant to the law’s
facial directive.
Another possibility is that the subjects view the external
restriction of their time to be something like a legal procedural rule.
Understood in that way, the fairness of the time limit could influence
the subjects’ sense of whether the legal system is procedurally just
and, in turn, whether applying the law straightforwardly is
satisfying. This explanation requires a bit of unpacking.
Numerous studies, many of which were coauthored by Tom Tyler,
have shown that perceptions of procedural justice influence peoples’
sense that the authority operating within those procedures is
legitimate.163 Their sense of legitimacy in turn influences their
163. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1975); TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000); TOM R. TYLER ET AL.,
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willingness to obey the authority that has promulgated or
maintained those procedures.164 For example, one such study found
that the fairness of court procedures was the primary influence on
peoples’ willingness to accept court decisions.165 The lesson of these
studies is that a subject’s opinion of the procedural dimensions of law
can influence how she responds to the content of the law.
Here, it could be that rule constrained subjects doubt the
righteousness of the strong time limit on their decisionmaking, and
this jaundices their view of the righteousness of the law that they
must interpret. In other words, these subjects could be critical of the
procedure under which they must operate, and this makes them
more likely to doubt the legitimacy of content of the law that they
have applied. On the other hand, those that are accorded unlimited
time to complete their adjudication of the issues might consider that
provision to be a supremely just procedural rule, so much so that
they experience an increase in their conviction. The size of this
legitimation effect is quite considerable, as the subjects feel that their
decision under law was more righteous than even their own,
conflicting decision without it. Perhaps because it must clear the
hurdle of baseline preference, the effect under the time unlimited
condition registered as half as powerful; the drop in strength of
conviction under the time limit was two times greater than the
increase under the time unlimited condition.
It might be wondered, however, why the time limit did not exhibit
the same effect under standards. While Tyler and others did not
consider the differential constraining power of rules and standards,166
it is easy to explain how only rules would have the power to affect
senses of legal legitimacy with respect to a particular case of legal
application. Here, the standard was a weak constraint on the
subjects. And even if the subjects were not pleased that they were
held to a strict time limit when applying the standard, it is possible
that the standard simply did not have enough constraining power to
force the subjects into decisions that they did not otherwise prefer.
Thus, on this account, any perceived procedural injustice would not
have had an influence on the subjects’ strengths of conviction.
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997); Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, How Can
Theories of Organizational Justice Explain the Effects of Fairness?, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 329-54 (Jerald Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt eds., 2005); Tom
R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830-38 (1989).
164. See sources cited supra note 163.
165. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND THE COURTS 55 (2002).
166. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An
Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic
Enforcement, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 501, 502 (2009) (considering similar issues and testing
different norm mechanisms such as standards vs. market-based instruments).
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The support for this reasoning becomes more apparent when we
distinguish between those subjects that successfully worked around
the rule and those that did not. This distinction between completely
constrained subjects and other subjects is appropriate because those
in the former group are indicating their strengths of conviction as to
two different outcomes across the two phases whereas those in the
latter group are indicating their strengths of conviction as to only one
outcome across the two phases. For those that followed the law, as
predicted, a constraining rule correlated with a significant overall drop
in strength of conviction.167 Moreover, a subject’s decision to submit to
the rule or not also impacted whether she experienced a drop in her
conviction. The graph below helps make these differences vivid:

167. Though we have heretofore been considering legal constraint, this effect is even
more pronounced if we include legally assisted subjects in the analysis—the subjects that
favored a denial of asylum in the baseline phase and therefore would favor a rule like the
one provided. All ten legally assisted subjects continued to deny asylum when given the
rule. Thus, simply knowing how the judges ruled in the baseline phase would allow correct
prediction of the outcome under the legal rule about 79% of the time. Furthermore,
whereas those subject to constraining legal rules experienced an overall drop in conviction,
those subject to legally assisting rules saw a considerable increase in their conviction (+.9).
Unfortunately, a lack of ideological diversity in the subject pool made it difficult to find
statistically significant findings with respect to legal assistance; there just weren’t that
many that wanted to deny asylum in the baseline phase. While the numbers are too small
to be reliable, the trends are nevertheless consistent with the hypotheses.
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Note that the bars under the standard condition are nearly identical
to each other; whereas the bars under the rules are vastly different in
both size and direction depending on whether the subject was
constrained and was under time limitation. Indeed, those that were
completely constrained experienced the strongest effects.
Moreover, this reasoning would further explain why those that
were subject to the time limit but did not surrender to the rule saw
no drop in strength of conviction. Upon seeing that they were subject
to the limit, the same resentment might have occurred, but the
subjects chose not to follow the straightforward dictate of the law and
therefore did not need to question the righteousness of the outcome.168
Skeptics might argue that the best explanation is much more
banal—namely, that subjects had lower strength of conviction under
the time limit because it forced them to rush and they were therefore
less confident that they reached the right result. There are three
reasons to doubt this explanation, however: (1) we do not see the drop
in strength of conviction with those subjects that were under the time
limit and a standard; (2) we do not see the same drop in conviction
with those subjects that did not surrender to the rule and were
subject to the time limit; and (3) subjects were not asked to indicate
on the Likert scale their confidence that they reached the right result
but rather whether the result was right, all-things-considered.
Now that we have a better sense of how the type of legal normcontent, judicial ideology, and the limitation of resources interact, we
are ready to turn to the question of how these results might inform
policy and avenues for future research.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: MAXIMIZING DESIRED CASE
OUTCOMES AND ITS RISKS
The findings of this study tell us something about how to
maximize the likelihood that judges will interpret legal norms in a
way that is consistent with the dictates of a legal norm. Thus, these
results ought to be of particular interest to those who legislate for
and control the workloads of judges, with the proviso, of course, that
further study is necessary.

168. Under this account, we would expect to see a similar, corresponding increase in
satisfaction among subjects who were legally assisted by the law. They too followed the law
and were presumably impressed with its wisdom. We do—their scores went up by nearly
an entire point, and they were the only other subjects in the experiment that exhibited an
increase. The number of conservatively-minded subjects was so low, however, that the
increase did not reach significance.
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A. Basic Legislative Guidelines
The results of this study concern two legislative tools—the choice
of the specificity of law and the choice to modify judicial resources. It
also considered two important consequences—case outcomes and the
strength of judges’ convictions that they have reached the right
outcome. At both the federal and state level, the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches wield these tools: they can
promulgate legal norms, controlling initially whether they are in the
form of rules or standards, and they each exercise some control over
the amount and dissemination of resources to judges. Legislatures
and executive branches often have control over court budget and
jurisdiction, which can impact the size of any individual judge’s
docket load. Judicial branches exercise similar controls, although to a
lesser extent. They can promulgate rules and standards through case
law, and they can limit or expand docket loads by doing such things
as implementing more or less restrictive appellate review policies,
issuing more or less dismissals, issuing more or fewer unpublished
decisions, and shifting workloads among individual judges.
Furthermore, each group cares about case outcomes.169 Even though
there is overlap in the goals of the three major players, there are
important conflicts in this particular context. Those parties that seek
to control the courts from the outside would likely seek maximum
control over court decisions at minimum costs. Courts would likely
seek maximum freedom over their decisions with maximum
resources. The findings here provide general guidelines for the use of
these tools to maximize desired case outcomes, but we must
also consider how the implementation of these guidelines will
likely produce a shifting give and take between legal constraint
and resources.
The results here support the notion that rules constrain better
than do standards. Because standards allow judges to reach the
result they prefer, and in a manner of their choosing, the
implementation effectively delegates to the judge the opportunity to
take over the legislative function of supplementing the norm with
rule-like content. Assuming that promulgating a rule is the same
price as promulgating a standard, 170 and the legislators feel confident

169. While it is less clear that both legislators and judges care about judges’
perceptions of righteousness, they certainly care about them insofar as they impact
case outcomes.
170. If we assume, however, as some economists do, that a rule is more expensive to
promulgate than a standard—as the cost of fleshing out the norm falls on the judiciary—
then a rule should only be employed when there is a payoff to outweigh the cost of
promulgation. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 621-22 (1992) (“If behavior subject to the law is infrequent, however, standards
are likely to be preferable. . . . Determining the appropriate content of the law for all such
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that they can draft a pure rule that calls for clear, desired outcomes,
then legislators will likely prefer to promulgate rules under those
circumstances where there is a fear that the judges might be
ideologically predisposed to make decisions that are at odds with
what the legislature wants.
The results further justify a legislative concern that ideologically
motivated judges will make efforts to “work” around the rules they
promulgate. Thus, the legislature will likely be interested in ways to
enhance the constraining power of their rules. One way to do this,
our results suggest, is to limit the resources that judges have to
adjudicate. This strategy is doubly tantalizing because the legislature
might have an independent interest in cutting the budget as much as
possible. In short, they might be able to achieve more with less. Let
us call this the “aggressive approach.”
The aggressive approach is perilous, however. In this study,
judges that complied with the rule under a time limit suffered a
precipitous drop in their strengths of conviction that they reached a
righteous result. Were such a drop to occur across the judiciary,
there could be an overall increase in judge dissatisfaction,
unhappiness, sloppiness, or worse.
At the outset, it bears mentioning that there are plenty of reasons
why limiting judicial resources is a risky policy. It could threaten
judges’ ability to meet the interests of justice by making them more
likely to commit reasoning or fact-finding errors, for example.171 If too
aggressive, it might actually increase erroneous interpretation of law.
Common sense (not to mention law school final exams) tells us that
rushing through legal problems increases the likelihood of mistake,
regardless of ideology or preference.
Another troubling possibility is that judges, as repeat players, will
eventually grow exhausted or resentful from feeling unsatisfied and,
as a result, will become more likely to allow their personal ideology to
dictate their decisions in spite of contrary legal directives. It could
very well be the case that the combination of rules and resource
limitation could bring about a risk of what could be described as a
“catapult effect.” That combination might make laws more
constraining, as if the legislature has shortened its leash on the
judiciary. As a result, its laws are more likely to bring about the state
of affairs that it desires, at least initially. We can forecast, however,
that increasing the tension on judges in this manner could snap the
leash, catapulting the judges in the opposite direction. The
contingencies would be expensive, and most of the expense would be wasted. It would be
preferable to wait until particular circumstances arise.”).
171. Cf. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95
YALE L.J. 62 (1985) (analyzing these concerns in the context of appeals of right).
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delegitimation effect could reach a point where the judges have
grown so embittered that they care even less about fidelity to law
than they did before they were restricted, and as a result the judges
are more likely to reach undesired outcomes than ever before. They
are catapulted into activism.
A catapult effect is just one countervailing force; there are others.
As mentioned, courts have defenses to resource restriction in their
arsenal. For example, affected judges might be able to soften the blow
of the resource restriction measure through avoidance tactics. They
might shift cases in the docket to allow them to devote the most time
to ideologically important cases, might delegate a higher proportion
of unimportant cases to staff attorneys, might kick more unimportant
cases on procedural grounds, might limit oral argument, etc.172 This
is not to suggest that any limitation measure would be ineffectual. A
time limitation or some similar measure would increase the cost of
engaging in “work” such that an overall decline in judicial activism
might be seen. But evasion tactics by courts could mitigate the effect,
and it might take more than one measure to effectively and desirably
limit the resources available to judges that would be inclined to
do work.
The potentially good news for those that promulgate laws is that
the combination of rules and unlimited time can produce a salutary
legitimation effect. There is evidence that it made completely
constrained legal interpreters feel more satisfied in the results of
their cases than if they had been able to decide those cases without
having the law as a guide! Assuming again that the law interpreters
are repeat players, such as judges are, then this combination might
have the effect of changing ideologies in the direction of the legal
directives to which they are subject. Just as the limit appeared to
sour time-limited subjects, the lack of a time limit on subjects under
the same legal rule appeared to make them embrace the law. Over
time and within the judiciary, this could impact the judge’s
underlying ideology in favor of the content of the rule. It is unclear
what amount of resources would be necessary in the real world to
produce a comparable legitimation effect, but further study might
provide some indication.
In a nutshell, then, there is support for the notion that
implementing rules and resource limitation has the arguable payoff
of increasing constraint, but it comes with the risk that constraint
will return or dip below pre-implementation levels if significant
delegitimation occurs. Implementing rules in an environment with
ample resources, however, has a weaker initial payoff, but the payoff

172. See Huang, supra note 16.
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might grow over time due to increased legitimation, as it could create
a sub-population of obedient, satisfied judges.
B. Limitations and Avenues for Further Study
Like those who have studied the relationship between resources
and judging before me, I believe that further study on this issue is
necessary before we draw any firm conclusions. Certain aspects of this
study were narrowed to maximize isolation of certain factors, and this
narrowing forced the omission of phenomena that might occur in a
real-life legal system. In systems in which judicial decisions are given
precedential effect, pure rules and standards can be difficult to find.
Not only do many norms fall somewhere between the rule and
standard poles,173 even initially polar rules and standards converge
towards each other over time.174
It is important to remember, however, that there are examples of
pure rules and standards like those used here in actual legal
systems, even if they mutate over time. And certainly the mutability
of rules and standards has not prevented the rule/standard
distinction from being widely heralded as useful and meaningful in a
variety of contexts. It would be strange indeed for a study of rules
and standards to employ weakened versions of each.
Moreover, this concern can be alleviated with a reminder of one of
the primary purposes of this study. This is the first study to link the
impact of resource restriction to a straightforward legal directive. As
a result, I began with the clearest example of the rule/standard
distinction in a considerably streamlined case. This allowed us to see
not only that a relationship between constraint and resources exists,
but also that the specificity of law matters. We risk overly scrupulous
adherence to external validity when we ignore that the laboratory
may be the best or only way to capture concept function.175 This is
173. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49 (1997) (“First, as is well recognized, ‘rules’ and
‘standards’ do not so much define a dichotomy as reflect ranges along a continuum.”).
174. As Frederick Schauer has noted:
When authorised to act in accordance with rules, rule-subjects will tend to
convert rules into standards by employing a battery of rule-avoiding devices
that serve to soften the hard edges of rules. . . . Conversely, the adaptive
behaviour of rule-subjects when given a standard goes in the opposite direction.
These rule-subjects, when given few rules in the rules-standards sense, will
make them themselves, and apply them to their own allegedly discretionary
behaviour, thus limiting significantly the case-sensitive discretion that it was
the intention of the rule-maker to grant.
Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303,
312 (2003).
175. Professor Douglas G. Mook advanced a similar justification even for experiments
that utterly fail to satisfy external validity concerns. See, e.g., Douglas G. Mook, In Defense
of External Invalidity, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 379, 382 (1983) (“[External validity is of no concern
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especially so when our intuitions about these concepts are already
used to justify particular governmental decisions in the absence of
rigorous empirical support, as is the case with the rules–standards
distinction.176 I leave it to future studies to experiment further with
the variability of specificity. Nevertheless, the results here are not to
be haphazardly applied to those situations in which judges apply
“standardized” rules or “rulified” standards, as are often found in
systems of precedent.177
Second, it is important to note that our judges were not
professional judges—they were law students. They were not repeat
players—they were asked to consider the facts on two separate
occasions. And the record they considered was quite streamlined.
These dimensions helped to isolate subject preferences, but it created
an impediment to generalizability, particularly to judges that have
extensive experience and expertise and make several factually and
legally similar determinations within a system of precedent. In this
way, then, this simulation is not particularly representative of the
very best of our courts, such as the flagship appellate courts at the
state and federal levels. It is much more representative of our worst
courts. Indeed, that the facts of the simulation here bore the closest
resemblance to our immigration courts or the Board of Immigration
Appeals is no coincidence. “Quite simply, IJs in many instances do
not understand the law. Extreme examples of such incompetence are
not hard to find. . . . Credibility determinations are repeatedly found
baseless . . . . The BIA, the administrative appellate unit of our
immigration courts, is also roundly criticized for its incompetence."178
Moreover, these courts typically have short or incomplete records and
inadequate argumentation.179 Most notably, the amount of time that
immigration judges spend on each case is not much longer than the
time spent by our time unlimited subjects, and the trend is
downward. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at
Syracuse University recently released a report showing that the
maximum amount of time that immigration judges could possibly
spend on each of their cases if they are ever to complete the cases in

in at least four cases.] First, we may be asking whether something can happen, rather than
whether it typically does happen. Second, our prediction may . . . specify something that
ought to happen in the lab . . . . Third, we may demonstrate the power of a phenomenon by
showing that it happens even under unnatural conditions that ought to preclude it. Finally,
we may use the lab to produce conditions that have no counterpart in real life at all . . . . ” ).
176. For example, courts have expressly considered even academic scholarship on rules
and standards. See Adams v. Plaza Fin. Co., 168 F.3d 932, 939 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d
1512, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring), rev’d sub nom., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
177. See Schauer, supra note 94.
178. Linda Kelly Hill, The Poetic Justice of Immigration, 42 IND. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2009).
179. See id.
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their backlog fell from 102 minutes to approximately 72 minutes in
the ten-year period between 1999 and 2009.180
And although my study leaves open the question of what would
happen with repeated cases of this sort over a longer period of time,
many judges face decisions that bear the features of one-shot
decisionmaking at least periodically.181
Finally, there are institutional dimensions of judging that do not
figure prominently in this study. In that vein, further research of the
phenomena seen here ought to examine whether they continue to
appear in a variety of institutional settings, manipulating variables
such as the known ideological composition of panel members, the
collegiality of colleagues, or the decisions of lower courts that might
affect them. Further experiments can change these variables to
examine how contextual factors, such as resources, might affect more
complex, strategic, ideologically driven behaviors.
Another opportunity for further study is to analyze the fragility of
rules and standards. While this study intentionally used very clear
examples of rules and standards, future studies could analyze how
the increasing rulification of standards or the standardization of
rules affects outcomes and conviction.
The results here showed that a particular resource limitation—
time—impacted the constraining power of rules, but it came at the
cost of weakening conviction. It remains to be seen whether other
types of resource limitation will produce these same effects. Of
particular philosophical interest will be to further investigate the
relationship between attitudes towards the content of the primary
rules of a legal system and resource limitation, which can under certain
circumstances be understood to be a secondary rule (particularly, a rule
of adjudication).182 This research could provide support for the notion
that we actually conceive of the legal system as a union of primary and
secondary rules, as H.L.A. Hart famously claimed.183
VII. CONCLUSION
This study provides empirical evidence of a complex interaction
between the amount of resources available to judges and the
180. Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts Expand, Resulting Wait Times Grow, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (June 18, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/.
181. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1153, 1202-03 (2002) (“The most important implication of this phenomenon is that
judgments in isolation will predictably produce incoherence from the standpoint of the very
people asked to make those judgments. . . . The pattern of within-category coherence, and
global incoherence, is a nearly inevitable product of adjudication that is defined by one-shot
judgments; the same pattern is embedded in many domains of law and policy.”).
182. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-95 (2d ed. 1994); see also id. at 80-81.
183. See id. at 94-95.
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likelihood that those judges will follow the straightforward dictates of
the law. The interaction has three dimensions. First, decreasing the
amount of available resources appears to have increased the
likelihood that subjects in this experiment were completely
constrained by the law to which they were subject. Second, this
reduction of resources—in particular, time—also appears to have
decreased the degree to which subjects believed that their decisions
were righteous. This emotional response to resource reduction might
be a red flag that limiting judicial resources would lead to job
dissatisfaction and legal delegitimation. Lastly, for any of these
interactions to occur, it appears that the law must be sufficiently
rule-like. Vague laws, such as standards, do not appear to produce
these results.
It bears mentioning that trends in the data suggest that providing
judges with ample resources can produce large legitimation effects.
Although there were not enough subjects to reach statistical
significance in this regard, those subjects that were completely
constrained under unlimited time felt that their legally guided
decisions were even more righteous than the decisions they would
make on their own in the absence of law.
In this era of austerity, those that control court budgets and
personnel will likely be heartened by the finding that providing fewer
resources to judges might, depending upon one’s view, improve
judicial performance. They would be wise, however, to take into
account the potential long-term costs of delegitimation and judge
dissatisfaction before making cuts or leaving seats vacant.
Looking forward, exploring the multifaceted relationship between
the law’s specificity, the judge’s conviction, and available judicial
resources could be the key to understanding how to maximize the
constraining power of law. These links might have gone undiscovered
under the prevailing empirical methodology for the study of judicial
decisionmaking. Fortunately, behavioral experimentation allowed
them to come to the fore.
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APPENDIX (EXPERIMENT FRAMEWORK)
INSTRUCTIONS184
[Bracketed material was not visible to subjects but is included here to
illustrate where different experimental conditions appeared for
different subject groups. There are minor discrepancies between the
text included below and the experiment as it appeared
to the subjects online, but this version gives an accurate sense of
the mechanic.]
[This is the fact pattern that was given to all test subjects]
Assume that you live in a country very much like this one and you
are asked to make a determination based on the following facts. You
are an immigration judge sitting on a court known as the Superior
Immigration Court. You are the first judge that has considered this
case. Because you are a judge, you ARE expected to know the relevant
laws of your system, which are provided. The facts are as follows:
A citizen of a foreign nation ("the alien") has legally entered our
country on August 1, 2007 with a valid 1-year work visa issued that
same day. He fled his home country after being persecuted for his
activism on behalf of the poor and his anti-establishment political
opinion. He had been imprisoned for his political protests briefly in
2006, and he and his family had been threatened by the local police
force. Worried for his personal safety, he obtained the visa and
arrived here. He could not speak English and was largely ignorant of
our laws regarding asylum, which is the mechanism our country uses
to allow aliens to reside here who have been or fear being persecuted
on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a social
group, or political opinion. He began working in a restaurant shortly
after his arrival, but his employer never asked him to show
documentation indicating that he was a legal worker. He was paid
under-the-table. On July 31, 2008, his visa expired. He continued to
work at the restaurant, however, receiving pay as usual for the next
13 months. At that point, a new employee began work at the same
restaurant. The new employee soon learned of the alien's experiences
in his home country and of his expired one-year visa. The new
employee explained to the alien that staying here after the expiration
of the visa was illegal but that he might qualify for asylum on the
ground of past persecution for political opinion. She suggested that
the alien file a petition for asylum. The alien retained a lawyer and
184. It bears noting that this design received Institutional Review Board approval.
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filed a petition about 4 weeks later on September 25, 2009. If granted
asylum, the alien will have the legal right to live here indefinitely. If
denied asylum, he will be removed from our country and transported
back to the country of his citizenship.
[In the non-law condition, the following appeared.]
Given these facts and assuming that they are true, please answer the
following questions:
1. The alien’s asylum application should be (one of the following):
___Granted ___Denied
2. On the scale below, indicate the strength of your conviction
that your answer for question 1 is the right thing to do, all
things considered (please circle one):
0-------1--------2-------3-------4-------5--------6-------7--------8------9-------10
(weakest)
(strongest)
[Button click here will bring up the following, which will be
timed, giving them about two minutes to read it.]
In this section you will be asked to write a justification for
your decision.
There is no time limit, so you may take as much time as you need.
Nevertheless, your response time will be recorded, so we ask that you
indicate in your response whether you have experienced technical
difficulties that affected the amount of time that it took to complete
the section. You may work for as long as it takes for you to write a
convincing justification. Please do not feel the need to work beyond
that point. When this disappears, the time will begin and a blank
document will appear with the fact pattern at the top and within
which you will write your justification.
There are no word or length limits of any kind. Your justification
will be reviewed by two other individuals that have been selected by
the designers of this experiment. These individuals will not be ____
Law Students. If you are able to convince at least one of these
individuals that you have reached the right result, you will be
entered into a lottery, the winner of which will receive $500. You will
be contacted on _____ if you are the winner. In the event that you
succeed in getting one or both of them to join you, your determination
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will have real-world consequences: If you choose to justify a grant of
asylum, $2 will be donated to the non-profit organization
Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees, which,
among other things “seeks to influence the philanthropic field to
advance the contributions and address the needs of the world's
growing and increasingly diverse immigrant and refugee
populations.” If you choose to justify a denial of asylum, $2 will be
given to the non-profit organization the Federation for American
Immigration Reform, which seeks, among other things, “to improve
border security, to stop illegal immigration, and to promote
immigration levels consistent with the national interest.”
__________________________
[In the law condition, the subjects randomly receive one of
the following two options.]

On June 1, 2007, two months before the citizen arrived and was
granted a visa, the country enacted its first set of immigration laws.
Among them was the following:
Sec. 1:02:
[Version A.1: Aliens seeking asylum must file their petitions no
later than 6 months after the day upon which their work
visas expire.]
[Version A.2: Aliens seeking asylum must file their petitions within
a reasonable time after the expiration of their work visas.]
Because the law is so new, there have been no cases brought by
the government pursuant to it. It is acceptable for courts to base
their decisions upon the laws, policies, purposes, or principles of
other jurisdictions, although that is ordinarily viewed as secondary
authority and, therefore, is not strictly binding.
Given these facts and assuming that they are true, please answer the
following questions:
1. The alien’s asylum application should be (one of the following):
___Granted ___Denied
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2. On the scale below, indicate the strength of your conviction
that your answer for question 1 is the right thing to do, all
things considered:
0-------1--------2-------3-------4-------5--------6-------7--------8------9-------10
(weakest)
(strongest)
[Button click here will bring up the following, which will be
timed, giving them about two minutes to read it.]
In this section you will be asked to write a legal opinion supporting
your decision.
[Version B.1: There is no time limit, so you may take as much time
as you need. Nevertheless, your response time will be recorded, so we
ask that you indicate in your response whether you have experienced
technical difficulties that affected the amount of time that it took to
complete the section. You may work for as long as it takes for you to
write a convincing opinion. Please do not feel the need to work
beyond that point. When this disappears, the time will begin, and a
blank document will appear with the fact pattern at the top and
within which you will write your opinion.]
[Version B.2: There is a strict time limit of 2 minutes for you to
write this opinion. Please indicate in your response whether you
experience technical difficulties during that time. When this
disappears, the time will begin, and a blank document will appear
with the fact pattern at the top and within which you will write
your opinion.]
There are no word or length limits of any kind. Your legal opinion
will be reviewed by the two other judges on your panel that have
been selected by the designers of this experiment. These judges will
not be [redacted for privacy] Law Students, and they are not the
same people that judged you last time. If you are able to convince at
least one of the judges that you have reached the right result, you
will be entered into a lottery, the winner of which will receive $500 (if
you have already been selected for the lottery in round one, then
success here will double your chances of winning). You will be
contacted on [date] if you are the winner. In the event that you
succeed in getting one or both of them to join you, your determination
will have real-world consequences: If you choose to justify a grant of
asylum, $2 will be donated to the non-profit organization
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Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees, which,
among other things “seeks to influence the philanthropic field to
advance the contributions and address the needs of the world's
growing and increasingly diverse immigrant and refugee
populations.” If you choose to justify a denial of asylum, $2 will be
given to the non-profit organization the Federation for American
Immigration Reform, which seeks, among other things, “to improve
border security, to stop illegal immigration, and to promote
immigration levels consistent with the national interest.” This will be
done regardless of whether money was given to one of these
organizations in the first round.
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